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RESIDENCY AND DEMOCRACY:
DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
FROM THE FRAMERS TO THE PRESENT
EUGENE D. MAZO*
ABSTRACT
After years of struggle, we no longer require property ownership, employ poll taxes, or
force citizens to take literary tests to vote. The franchise is now also open to women, African
Americans, and other groups that were previously disenfranchised. However, our states still
prevent citizens from voting if they fail to meet a durational residency requirement. The
states also impose lengthy durational residency requirements on candidates seeking public
office. This Article examines the history of America’s durational residency requirements. It
looks at the debates of the framers at the Constitutional Convention, at how state durational
residency requirements were broadened in response to migration in the 1800s, and at how
durational residency requirements were narrowed by the federal government and the Supreme Court in the 1970s. The result left a system in which durational residency requirements impact voters and candidates differently, and in which these requirements differ at
the state and federal levels. In most states, durational residency requirements for voters have
been substantially curtailed, while they remain on the books for candidates. To show how
this impacts politics, this Article examines several high-profile durational residency contests.
It also probes whether these requirements may ever be justified in American democracy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In American democracy today, most historic restrictions on voting
have been removed. The states no longer require their citizens to own
property, pay a poll tax, or take a literary test before they can vote.
The franchise has also been broadened to include women, African
Americans, and other groups that were previously disenfranchised.
Our country’s democratic self-image has long been firmly rooted in
the belief that the United States has continually expanded suffrage
for all of its citizens who desire the right to vote. As the Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections explained thirty years ago,
with only a touch of hyperbole, “[B]y the 200th anniversary of the
nation the only remaining restrictions [on the franchise] prevented
voting by the insane, convicted felons and otherwise eligible voters
who were unable to meet short residence requirements.”1
It is well known among scholars that many states disenfranchise
the mentally unfit, those convicted of felonies, and a third group that
often goes unmentioned, non-citizen aliens. The reasons these groups
lack voting rights are rooted in American history. But who constitutes the group of “eligible voters” who are unable to vote because
they fail to meet “short residence requirements”? It turns out that
almost every state requires its new citizens to meet a short residence
requirement before they can vote. Known as a durational residency
requirement, the states also impose these qualifications on those who
seek office. This is a phenomenon, however, that has not been adequately studied, and it remains widely under-theorized.
Geographical residency is part of democracy. Politicians are elected from geographical districts, and they represent the people of those
districts in office. A United States Senator is elected to represent the
people of his state. A Congressman represents the people of a particular district in that state. In turn, a citizen from a geographically
bounded state votes for a Senator who will represent him, just as a
resident of a geographically bounded district votes for that district’s
Congressman. No one would seriously advocate for the residents of a
different state or district to vote for these government officials. What
is less appreciated is that a new resident of the state who wishes to
vote for his preferred candidate may often not be able to do so until
he first meets a durational residency requirement. This means that a
citizen not only has to reside in a certain geographical district to vote
for its representatives, but that he must also demonstrate his legal
residence there for a certain, set period of time.
1. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 324 (2d ed. 1985); see also
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED STATES, at xx (rev. ed. 2009) (quoting the Congressional Quarterly and positing that its statement was made with hyperbole).
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Durational residency requirements exist for candidates as well.
After all, democracy involves not only the right to cast a free vote, but
also the right to run freely for elected office. Just as voters have to
satisfy certain durational residency requirements before they can
cast a ballot in a given state or district, so too do politicians have to
meet durational residency requirements in most states and municipalities before they can run for office.2 The durational residency hurdles that political candidates face, however, often look very different
from those that voters encounter. The durational residency requirements for politicians are typically much longer in length, and they
have not been subject to the same kinds of constitutional challenges
as those for voters, other than in rare circumstances.
As a society, we take durational residency requirements for granted. Only a few scholars have ever examined durational residency requirements in any serious or systematic way. Even then, most scholars have argued against them.3 Preventing citizens from voting
because they live in the right district but have not lived there long
enough is seen as being anti-democratic, while preventing candidates
who do not meet a durational residency qualification from running
for office is viewed as little more than an attempt to prevent carpetbagging. This, at least, is what the literature on durational residency
requirements argues.4 Yet states and municipalities have not always
viewed things this way. Instead, they have advanced many reasons
for preserving durational residency requirements. When one scratches
the surface, durational residency requirements turn out to be more
complicated than they appear. They also have a long history in American jurisprudence, one that dates all the way back to the colonies.

2. For some offices, these durational residency requirements can be quite lengthy.
This is particularly true for state governors. For example, Missouri and Oklahoma’s state
constitutions require ten years of residency for a governor. See MO. CONST. art. IV, § 3
(Missouri); OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (Oklahoma). Other states require seven years of residency. See MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. 2, § 1, art. II (Massachusetts); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art.
XLII (New Hampshire); N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 2 (New Jersey); PA. CONST. art.
IV, § 5 (Pennsylvania); TENN. CONST. art. III, § 3 (Tennessee). Three states require six
years. See DEL. CONST. art. III, § 6 (Delaware); GA. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. IV (Georgia);
KY. CONST. § 72 (Kentucky); see also discussion infra Section III.A.
3. See, e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Against Residency Requirements, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
341, 341 (2015) (stating that “residency requirements are one aspect of election law that
does not serve the electorate and should be eliminated as a condition for obtaining and
holding elected office”); Frederic S. LeClercq, Durational Residency Requirements for Public Office, 27 S.C. L. REV. 847, 914 (1976) (“Durational residency requirements for public
office significantly dilute fundamental rights which deserve, and have received, judicial
protection: the right to vote, the right of political association and the right to travel. Such
requirements can and should be invalidated whenever they interfere with the exercise of
these fundamental constitutional rights.”).
4. See, e.g., Pitts, supra note 3, at 353 (explaining how a “possible benefit of residency requirements . . . is to prevent carpet bagging”).
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This Article seeks to examine America’s durational residency requirements in historical and comparative terms. In doing so, it aims
to make the case that these requirements are not anti-democratic
and that, in some circumstances, they are both necessary and essential for democracy. The few scholars who have examined durational
residency requirements in the past have tried to argue against them,
but without appreciating their place in our history. This Article seeks
to blend history and modern law in a way that no one has. It argues
that durational residency requirements have their place in democratic politics. Its purpose is to explain the origins of our durational residency requirements, to chronicle their history, and to probe the contours of when they may be justified in American democracy.
There are various kinds of durational residency requirements.
They differ from one another in terms of their length, how they are
imposed, and whom they affect. There are also different policies behind them. Perhaps the greatest distinctions among durational residency requirements concern whom they affect: voters or candidates.
At one time, the durational residency requirements for voters were
extensive, yet they have in recent years been severely curtailed.
Meanwhile, the residency qualifications for political candidates, at
least in the individual states, often remain lengthy to this day.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II examines the history of
our durational residency requirements, going all the way back to the
colonies and the Constitutional Convention. Part III focuses on durational residency requirements for voters. It explains how these qualifications blossomed in the states in the 1800s before being severely
narrowed by Congress and by the Supreme Court in the 1970s. Part
IV turns to an examination of durational residency requirements for
candidates. It highlights the mismatch that exists between the state
level, where durational residency requirements persist, and the federal level, where durational residency requirements do not exist. It
also examines several high-profile residency challenges, including
those faced by Rahm Emanuel when he ran for mayor of Chicago, by
Zephyr Teachout when she challenged Andrew Cuomo in the Democratic primary for governor of New York, and by Hillary Clinton
when she ran for the Senate from New York. Part V examines the
democratic justifications for durational residency requirements.
II. A HISTORY OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
A. In the Colonies
The requirement that a person has to live in a state for a certain
period of time before he can participate in the democratic process is
so ingrained in the American psyche that most of us fail to question
it. Durational residency requirements have a long history that can be
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traced back to before the time of the country’s founding. Indeed,
these requirements were enshrined in many of our founding documents, including in many state constitutions. They were also hotly
debated by the framers at the Constitutional Convention.
For more than a decade before the framers of the Constitution met
in Philadelphia, the colonies had crafted their own unique voting
rules. These laws were largely shaped by the knowledge that the colonists had of how representation worked in England.5 The English
system of democracy was initially designed to represent land. As Professor James Gardner explains, in feudal England landholders held
estates under the condition that they would provide financial assistance to the crown.6 Only those who owned land could be summoned
to Parliament for the purpose of giving their consent to being taxed
by the King. As the rise of commerce expanded, the English monarchs decided that it would be in their interest to invite representatives of various town and boroughs, where merchant wealth was located, to join them in Parliament. However, the system under which
Parliament represented a taxed unit of land persisted.7
The English model was eventually adopted in the American colonies, where new colonial legislatures also initially allocated their
seats to territorial units. In Massachusetts, the representatives who
held seats in the colonial legislature represented towns; in Virginia,
they represented plantations; and in South Carolina, they represented parishes.8 By the time of the American Revolution, the Founding
Fathers were familiar with this territorial system of representation
and fully accepted it.9 This is why only property owners, most of
whom happened to be white and male, had the right to vote. Property
owners were thought to have a “stake in society.”10 Like their English
forbearers, they were considered to be committed members of the
community with a vested interest in public policy, especially regarding matters of taxation.11 Those who owned land were thought to
have sufficient independence to make their own sound judgment on
matters of governance.12 The idea that some men were in “so mean a
situation” that they “had no will of their own,” a phrase attributed to
Blackstone, was heard often during the Founding Era and applied to

5. See KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 4.
6. James A. Gardner, Partitioning and Rights: The Supreme Court’s Accidental Jurisprudence of Democratic Process, 42 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 61, 66-67 (2014).
7. Id. at 67.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 68.
10. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 4.
11. Id. at 4-5.
12. Id. at 5.
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those who did not own land.13 The colonists believed that the franchise should not extend to such persons. The fact that only landowners could vote was a natural consequence of this view.
During the Founding Era, suffrage was treated as a state constitutional issue. In all of the states, apart from one, the rules of voting
were found in state constitutions, and not, as they would be hundreds
of years later, in statutes or municipal codes. Early state constitutions were replete with durational residency requirements, not only
for voting but also for seeking public office.14 In many of the colonies,
political candidates for office had to prove that they resided in the
colony for a certain number of years before they could seek election.15
Since the colonies were independent from one another, each sought to
restrict its political community to those who held a true interest in
the colony’s affairs. A clause addressing each state’s durational residency requirements was a common feature in state constitutions of
the era, and it helped accomplish this goal. State durational residency requirements would later become more controversial, but early on,
they were deeply rooted in the American colonial experience.16
B. At the Constitutional Convention
The records and debates of the Constitutional Convention provide
us with some insight into what our Founding Fathers thought of durational residency requirements. During the debates that took place
in Philadelphia in 1787, three distinct justifications were advanced
for why these requirements were needed.17 The first was to assure
that candidates were knowledgeable about local matters.18 The second was to prevent wealthy foreign nations from sending over emissaries to the United States and having them purchase their way to
public office.19 The third was to discourage wealthy men from neighboring states from seeking public office elsewhere after they had
failed to secure election in their own state.20 This last practice was

13. Id. at 9.
14. See Frederic S. LeClercq, The Emerging Federally Secured Right of Political Participation, 8 IND. L. REV. 607, 612-13 (1975).
15. See id. at 613.
16. See, e.g., A. MCKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH
COLONIES IN AMERICA 135-36 (1905) (explaining that South Carolina imposed a durational
residency requirement on suffrage as early as 1693).
17. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 216-19, 235-39 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION].
18. Id. at 216 (George Mason of Virginia); id. at 217 (John Rutledge of South Carolina).
19. Id. at 216 (George Mason of Virginia) (“It might also happen that a rich foreign
Nation, for example Great Britain, might send over her tools who might bribe their way
into the Legislature for insidious purposes.”).
20. Id. at 218 (George Mason of Virginia).
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known to be “the practice in the boroughs of England,”21 and it was
part of what led to that country’s “rotten borough” system. England’s
boroughs were infamous for sending representatives to Parliament
from districts that had few remaining residents. These “rotten boroughs” also sometimes elected wealthy non-residents to office who
secured a seat in Parliament from neighboring or even isolated districts.22 The Founding Fathers abhorred this practice, which they believed turned democratic representation into an illusion.23
The Founding Fathers understood that durational residency requirements applied separately to candidates and voters. But their
debates concerned only how these rules applied to candidates. A
complicated patchwork of state suffrage rules had proliferated in the
individual states by the time the framers met in Philadelphia in
1787. This patchwork, as Virginia’s delegate James Wilson explained, made it “difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications
[for voting] for all the states.”24 For the men who came together to
write the new Constitution, voting was thought to be a state issue.
Though not all of the framers held this view, many did. These men
believed that questions regarding who got to vote should be left to the
states, rather than dictated by the federal government.25
In Philadelphia, some delegates wanted the rules for voting to be
regulated by the Constitution. Other delegates insisted that this was
a matter best left to the states. A compromise had to be reached between the conflicting views. In the end, the new Constitution forged a
link between the suffrage rules of the states and the right to vote in
federal elections by allowing only those people in each state who had
met the qualifications to vote for the “most numerous Branch of
the[ir] state legislature” to vote for the members of the new House of

21. Id.
22. See LeClercq, supra note 3, at 852 n.23; see also generally JOHN CANNON,
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM, 1640-1832 (1972); EDWARD PORRITT, THE UNREFORMED HOUSE
OF COMMONS: PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION BEFORE 1832 (1903).
23. See LeClercq, supra note 3, at 852 n.23 (quoting G. Campion, Parliament, 17.
ENCY. BRITANNICA 316 (1958)).
24. See KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 18; see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 82, 224-25 (1997).
25. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 249 (John
Rutledge of South Carolina) (“observing, that the Committee [on Detail] had reported no
qualifications [should be included in the Constitution for membership in Congress] because
they could not agree on any among themselves”); id. (Oliver Elseworth of Connecticut)
(“The different circumstances of different parts of the U.S. and the probable difference
between the present and future circumstances of the whole, render it improper to have
either uniform or fixed qualifications. Make them so high as to be useful in the S. States,
and they will be inapplicable to the E. States. Suit them to the latter, and they will serve
no purpose in the former. . . . [I]t was better to leave this matter to the Legislative discretion than to attempt a provision for it in the Constitution.”).
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Representatives.26 The U.S. House would become the only institution
for which the Constitution demanded a popular electoral process of
any kind.27 Again, this was because of the need to placate the delegates who saw voting as a state issue. Whether a durational residency requirement applied to a person voting for the member of the U.S.
House would ultimately be determined by the law of his state.28
However, the question of whether a political candidate seeking to
become a member of the U.S. House should have to meet a durational
residency requirement in the state from which he was being elected
remained contested, and was hotly debated. This debate centered
around how the country’s new Constitution would guarantee mobility
while protecting local interests. Questions concerning how durational
residency requirements applied to political candidates were often intertwined in the minds of the framers with questions concerning a
candidate’s citizenship. On Wednesday, August 8, 1787, at the Constitutional Convention,29 George Mason of Virginia explained that he
“was for opening a wide door for emigrants; but did not chuse [sic] to
let foreigners and adventurers make laws for us & govern us.”30 For
this reason, the delegates suggested that a three-year citizenship requirement should be imposed on members of the new House of Representatives. George Mason, however, proposed that a member of the
House of Representatives should have to be a citizen for seven years
before his election, not three years.31
The seven-year citizenship requirement passed without objection,
with every state but one agreeing to it.32 But when the next part of
the clause governing the requirements of electing the members of the
House of Representatives was debated—it originally stated that every member “shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the
State in which he shall be chosen”33—consensus quickly broke down.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in
each state shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch
of the State Legislature.”); see also KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 18.
27. See KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 18.
28. See id.
29. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 213-19.
30. Id. at 216 (George Mason of Virginia).
31. Id.
32. Connecticut was the one exception. See id.
33. Id. at 216 n.3 (emphasis added). Originally the draft read:
Article IV, Sect. 2. “Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of
the age of twenty five years at least; shall have been a citizen of the United
States for at least three years before his election; and shall be, at the time of
his election, a resident of the State to which he shall be chosen.”
See id. The three-year citizenship requirement was changed to “seven.” Id. at 216. The word
resident was changed to “inhabitant” after a somewhat lengthier debate. Id. at 216-18.
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Roger Sherman of Connecticut argued that the word “resident”
should be substituted by the word “inhabitant.”34 Madison found both
terms vague, but he believed that at least the latter “would not exclude persons absent occasionally for a considerable time on public or
private business” from holding office.35 Gouverneur Morris was opposed to both terms. Imposing “[s]uch a regulation is not necessary,”
Morris argued, because “[p]eople rarely chuse [sic] a nonresident.”36
“Resident” had a certain meaning to the framers based on their understanding of residency requirements in the states. That meaning
was tied to the legal period of time a person had to live in a state.
Some delegates continued to argue that a durational residency
requirement for candidates should appear in the Constitution. John
Rutledge of South Carolina, for instance, urged his fellow delegates
to include a provision stating “that a residence of 7 years [should] be
required in the State Wherein the Member [should] be elected.”37
This ensured knowledgeable candidates for public office. “An emigrant from [New] England to [South Carolina] or Georgia would
know little of its affairs,” Rutledge told the others, “and could not be
supposed to acquire a thorough knowledge in less time.”38 George
Mason agreed with him. “I am in favor of Residency—if you do not
require it—a rich man may send down to the Districts of a state in
[which] he does not reside and purchase an Election for his [Dependent],” Mason explained.39 “This is the practice in the boroughs of England.”40 Other delegates agreed with the need for a durational residency requirement, but they urged a much shorter term. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut thought requiring seven years of residency was
too much. He suggested that one year would be sufficient, though he
also stated that he had no objection to making it three years.41
The arguments of those who opposed the residency requirement
ultimately won out. John Mercer of Maryland argued that the durational residency requirement would discourage men who had once
been inhabitants of a state, but had since moved elsewhere, from returning.42 He believed that such a regulation would create “greater
alienship among the States than existed under the old federal sys34. Id. at 216.
35. Id. at 217.
36. Id. (Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania).
37. Id. (John Rutledge of South Carolina); id. at 225 (Notes of Rufus King of Massachusetts) (explaining that Mr. Rutledge wanted the clause to require one to be a “[r]esident
for seven years in the State where he is elected”).
38. Id. (John Rutledge of South Carolina).
39. Id. at 225 (Notes of Rufus King of New York).
40. Id. at 218 (George Mason of Virginia).
41. Id. at 217-18 (Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut).
42. Id. at 217 (John Francis Mercer of Maryland).
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tem” of the Articles of Confederation, and that it would “interweave
local prejudices & State distinctions in the very Constitution which is
meant to cure them.”43 At the end of the day, the proposal for requiring a member of the House of Representatives to satisfy a three-year
durational residency requirement in the state from which he was
elected was defeated by a vote of nine to two.44 The proposal for a
one-year durational residency requirement was also defeated, this
time six to four.45 The view prevailed on the majority of the delegates
that durational residency requirements did not belong in the federal
Constitution: “[W]e are now forming a National Government,” George
Read of Delaware reminded his colleagues, “and such a regulation
would correspond little with the idea that we are one people.”46
Similar controversies over a durational residency requirement
took place the next day, on August 9, 1787, when the qualifications
for serving in the United States Senate were debated. Members of
the Senate were originally to be chosen by their state legislatures.47
(It was only 125 years later, after the Seventeenth Amendment was
ratified in 1913, that U.S. Senators became popularly elected.48) But
not all of the framers trusted the state legislatures to select a proper
candidate, and some argued that a durational residency requirement,
or at least a citizenship requirement, should be imposed. After fervent debate, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention agreed
that a citizenship requirement would have to be met: members of the
House already had to be citizens for seven years,49 and a debate ensued over how long the qualification for Senators should be. Arguing
against “the danger of admitting strangers into our public Councils,”
Gouverneur Morris insisted on a time period of fourteen years.50
43. Id. (John Francis Mercer of Maryland).
44. Id. at 219. Only Georgia and South Carolina were in favor of the three-year
requirement.
45. Id. Georgia, South Carolina, New Jersey, and North Carolina voted for the oneyear requirement; see also id. at 225 (Notes of Rufus King) (“[A] question was put & negatived by 8 of 11 states to insert Inhabitant for 3 yrs. – afterwards the question for One yr.
before Election was negatived by 6 of 11 . . . .”); id. at 226 (Notes of James McHenry of
Maryland) (“It was proposed to add to the section ‘at least one year preceding his election’
[but this requirement for a member of the House was] negatived.”).
46. Id. at 217 (George Read of Delaware).
47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years . . . .”).
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed
of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years . . . . The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous
branch of the State legislatures.”).
49. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall
not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the
United States . . . .”).
50. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 235 (Gouverneur
Morris of Pennsylvania).
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Charles Pinkney of South Carolina seconded this motion, adding that
because “the Senate is to have the power of making treaties & managing our foreign affairs, there is peculiar danger and impropriety in
opening its door to those who have foreign attachments.”51 George
Mason suggested that membership in the new Senate might even be
restricted to the native-born.52
During a vigorous debate, other delegates opposed these restrictions. Some, such as Oliver Ellsworth, saw them as “discouraging meritorious aliens from emigrating to this Country.”53 Benjamin
Franklin was also against any durational residency or citizenship
requirement. He tried to persuade his colleagues that the United
States had many friends and allies in Europe, adding, “We found in
the Course of the Revolution, that many strangers served us faithfully – and that many natives took part [against] their Country.”54
Franklin’s view was that when “foreigners after looking about for
some other Country in which they can obtain more happiness, give a
preference to ours, it is a proof of attachment which ought to excite
our confidence & affection.”55 He saw the fourteen-year citizenship
proposal as an “illiberality inserted in the Constitution.”56
Edmund Randolph of Virginia similarly argued that it would be
unwise to prevent immigrants from participating in the public life of
their new country for a period of fourteen years.57 And James Wilson,
who was born in Scotland, pointed to the irony that, under the proposed rules, he would not be able to hold office under the very Constitution that he had a hand in making. Wilson told his colleagues of
how, when he arrived in Maryland, he found himself “from defect of
residence, under certain legal incapacities, which never ceased to
produce chagrin,” even when he “did not desire . . . the offices to
which they related.”58 To be incapable of being appointed to an office
in one’s country was “a circumstance grating, and mortifying.”59 Like
Benjamin Franklin, James Madison also considered such a “restriction . . . in the Constitution unnecessary, and improper.”60 It was

51. Id. (Charles Pinkney of South Carolina).
52. Id. (George Mason of Virginia) (“Were it not that many not natives of this Country
had acquired great merit during the revolution, he should be for restraining the eligibility
into the Senate, to natives.”).
53. Id. (Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut).
54. Id. at 236 (Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania).
55. Id. at 236-37 (Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania).
56. Id. at 236 (Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania).
57. Id. at 237 (Edmund Randolph of Virginia).
58. Id. (James Wilson of Pennsylvania).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 235 (James Madison of Virginia).
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unnecessary because Congress had already been given the power to
regulate the rules for naturalization. It was improper because it
would give “a tincture of illiberality to the Constitution.”61
The idea of a fourteen-year citizenship requirement was ultimately defeated by a vote of seven to four. Periods of thirteen and ten
years, respectively, were proposed and were also defeated at the Constitutional Convention.62 To compromise, Edmund Randolph proposed that a period of seven years be considered, but John Rutledge
countered by saying that since a period of seven years had been proposed for the House, a longer timeframe was required for the Senate,
which would have more power. Randolph thus proposed a nine-year
period. The motion to require Senators to be citizens for nine years
passed by a vote of six to four. Less controversially, the requirement
that a Senator be a “Resident” of his state when elected was replaced
with the requirement that he be an “Inhabitant” of that state.63 This,
again, was done to avoid squabbling over the eligibility for holding
federal office and to defeat efforts to adopt state durational residency
requirements for members of the House and Senate.64
The delegates could not agree over whether to impose durational
residency requirements on federal officeholders, and compromises
had to be made to move forward. One of those compromises was that
a durational citizenship requirement was imposed on the four elected
offices listed in the Constitution: Representative, Senator, Vice President, and President.65 Each person who held one of these offices
would be required to hold United States citizenship for a certain
number of years. Although the debate over this requirement was
closely tied in the minds of the framers to their debates over durational residency requirements, there were also important differences.
The durational citizenship requirements that the framers wrote into
the Constitution did not foreclose the possibility of an individual with
political aspirations for holding federal office from moving to a new
state.66 By contrast, a lengthy durational residency requirement
would have surely put up barriers to a newcomer who was looking to
run for office in a state that was not originally his own.
The framers’ decision to link national suffrage to state suffrage
laws meant that durational residency requirements would be preserved for the nation’s new voters, given that these requirements al61. Id. at 235-36 (James Madison of Virginia).
62. Id. at 230.
63. Id. at 239.
64. See LeClercq, supra note 3, at 854.
65. See Derek Muller, Scrutinizing Federal Electoral Qualifications, 90 IND. L.J. 559,
563 (2015) (noting there were four elected offices listed in the Constitution: President, Vice
President, Senator, and Representative).
66. Id. at 563-72.
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ready existed in most states. Durational residency requirements
would also be preserved for candidates seeking state office, but they
would not apply to those seeking federal office. This early divergence
between state and federal practice concerning durational residency
requirements would influence the political landscape for the next two
hundred years. There was only one exception to this durational residency mismatch, and it concerned the offices of the President and
Vice President. The new Constitution of 1787 called for a complex
system of choosing “electors” in each state, who would cast ballots to
fill these two offices. The electors’ ballots were to be sent to Congress
to count. The candidate who received the most ballots would become
President, and the candidate with the second-most Vice President.67
The Constitution left it up to the legislatures of the states, however,
to determine how these electors would be chosen, specifying only the
number that each state was allotted.68 However, not everyone was
eligible to be President: the Constitution designated both a citizenship and a durational residency requirement for that office.
When the delegates met on August 22, 1787, exactly two weeks
after they had decided not to impose a durational residency requirement on candidates for the new Congress, they inserted language into their constitutional draft requiring that the country’s new President be “a Citizen of the United States, and shall have been an Inhabitant thereof for Twenty one years.”69 It is not evident from the
delegates’ notes when this clause was debated.70 However, by September 4, when the delegates discussed how the electors’ votes would
be counted, this language was changed to say that a person could not
be elected to the office of President “who has not been in the whole, at
least 14 years a resident within the U.S.”71 The framers retained this
fourteen-year requirement, and the Constitution, as ratified, specified that no person could be President unless he “[has] been fourteen
Years a Resident within the United States.”72 The citizenship re67. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
164-69 (1913) (chronicling the debates of the framers about how the new President of the
United States would be elected).
68. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”).
69. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 367.
70. See id. at 369-79 (Journal of Mr. James Madison and Mr. James McHenry for
August 22, 1787).
71. Id. at 494 (emphasis added).
72. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible
to the Office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not
have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the
United States”) (emphasis added); see also Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the
United States: The Unresolved Enigma, 28 MD. L. REV. 1 (1968); Jordan Steiker, Sanford
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quirement was also strengthened, so that the President now not only
had to be “a Citizen of the United States,” but also could not serve
unless he was actually “a natural born Citizen.”73
When the Twelfth Amendment was ratified in 1804, it changed
the way the electors selected the President and Vice President. That
Amendment added that “no person constitutionally ineligible to the
office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the
United States.”74 This meant that the fourteen-year durational requirement for President would now apply to the office of the Vice
President as well. At the federal level today, these are the only two
offices for which a durational residency requirement is mandated.
But this durational qualification, it is again important to note, is different from the state requirements, for it does not restrict a candidate from moving among the states or around the country.
By contrast, the Constitution does not impose a durational residency requirement for the House or Senate. It only requires that a
representative for the House from any state be “an Inhabitant of that
State” at the time “when elected.”75 A similar requirement applies to
candidates for the U.S. Senate.76 Beyond these requirements, the Supreme Court has held that the states do not have the power to add
additional qualifications for federal candidates.77 However, most
states have the power to impose such requirements on their own
state officials. As such, durational residency rules at the state and
municipal level became common. Many states imposed some form of
a durational residency requirement on their elected state officials,
including their governors, legislators, judges, and mayors. Equally,
they imposed durational residency requirements on their voters.

Levinson & J. M. Balkin, Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1995).
73. Compare 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 367, with id.
at 494; and U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen . . . shall
be eligible to the Office of President.”) (emphasis added).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
75. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Indeed, there have been times in American history
when a candidate elected to federal office happened to be an inhabitant of another state
immediately before his election. See, e.g., Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582,
589 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting one instance when an elected representative actually moved
into his new state of residence two weeks before his election).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No person shall be a Senator . . . who shall not, when
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”).
77. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that
states have no power to add electoral qualifications for candidates to federal offices beyond
those enumerated in the Constitution); Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.M. 1972)
(holding additional state two-year residency requirement imposed by the state of New Mexico for a federal candidate to be unconstitutional).
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C. In the States
The laws governing the right to vote, according to Professor Alexander Keyssar, were “elaborated and significantly transformed”
throughout the country between 1790 and 1850.78 Many of the individual states held constitutional conventions during this time, sometimes more than once. How political power would be allocated in the
young but quickly growing republic became a subject of intense debate in many state and local communities. Among other things, even
the physical act of voting began to take a different shape. At the time
of the founding, according to Professor Keyssar, the procedures used
for voting differed “from state to state and even from town to town.”79
In some counties, voting had been an oral act. Men assembled before
election judges and cast their vote when their name was called.80 In
other counties, voting took place through written ballots. These were
at first printed by political parties, but as abuses arose and vote rigging became more commonplace, the states eventually took over the
printing of election ballots and running of elections.81
As the states began to play an increasingly dominant role in elections, new laws developed to govern these contests. Suddenly, states
had to define what it meant to be a “resident” or “inhabitant,” how
one satisfied this requirement, and what documents a voter had to
show to prove his citizenship and residency qualifications before casting his ballot.82 The states also had to develop the administrative capacity to deal with running elections, not to mention the judicial ability to resolve election disputes. At the time of the Revolution, property ownership had nearly universally been a qualification for suffrage.
But by 1790, this requirement that only freeholders could vote began
being dismantled.83 Sometimes the property qualification was replaced with other economic qualifications for suffrage.84
The gradual elimination of property qualifications for voting did
not mean that all economic qualifications were eliminated. Rather, as
the right to vote expanded in the nineteenth century, poll taxes and
other economic qualifications would be substituted, often in pernicious ways, to restrict the franchise. Still, the demise of the property
qualification was significant. It meant that society no longer thought
voters needed “Blackstonian independence”85 to exercise the right to
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 23.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.
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vote, and it meant that individual states could no longer restrict the
franchise to a small, select group of men. Soon people would find that
they did not have to put down roots in order to vote, or at least the
kind of deep roots that property ownership signified.
Out of fear that the polls would be open to a large number of vagrants and migratory individuals, the states increasingly began to
turn to durational residency rules to define and control their electorates. To be sure, some states welcomed newly eligible voters, and
many passed legislation making it easier for those from the poorer
classes who did not own land, and who were previously disenfranchised, to vote. Yet in many states, durational residency requirements were designed to prevent migrants from voting or from influencing the composition and functioning of the government in a place
where they were temporarily located and did not intend to stay. As
durational residency requirements were refined by state governments, local municipalities often copied what happened in state capitals, moving to match the new state-mandated requirements.
Where state governments played with their residency rules, the
tinkering depended on whether the state was in need of new workers
and new labor, or whether, instead, it wanted to keep newcomers out.
Delaware, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Indiana, and Michigan
shortened their durational residency requirements.86 Some states
that were in need of more people, particularly those in the Midwest,
not only relaxed their durational residency requirements but also
even went as far as to extend the franchise to non-citizen aliens.87 By
the 1830s, most state governments had rules regulating their durational residency requirements for voting. What the proper length for
these rules should be was often the subject of heated debate.88 According to Professor Keyssar, the average length of a state durational
residency requirement for a new voter was one year in the state and
three to six months in his town or county.89 But the length also varied
by region, usually depending on whether the political entity in question wanted to welcome newcomers to its borders or not.
When newcomers were desired, durational residency requirements
were shortened. Extending the suffrage to new arrivals encouraged
migration. Especially in the newly settled states of the Midwest,
where labor was in demand, short durational residency requirements
became the norm. On the other hand, in many of the states located
along the eastern seaboard, where immigrants were plentiful and
where they increasingly settled in urban areas with large popula86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 51-52.
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tions, longer durational residency requirements became much more
commonplace. Table 1, which is based on calculations originally made
by Professor Keyssar, illustrates the residency requirements that existed in each state between 1870 and 1923.90
In addition to regulating the duration of their residencies, states
also attempted to define who qualified to be a “resident” for purposes
of voting. A number of states attempted to regulate their suffrage
rules by preventing certain classes of inhabitants from qualifying for
residency status entirely, regardless of their duration in the state.
For instance, military personnel who happened to be locally stationed
were excluded from voting by a number of the states.91 Between 1850
and 1900, more than thirty states included a provision in their state
constitutions that prevented voting rights from being extended to
resident soldiers temporarily stationed within the state’s borders.92
Oklahoma added this requirement to its state constitution in 1907,
Michigan did so in 1908, and Arizona followed suit in 1910. The goal
of these provisions was to prevent transients from influencing
a community. Not until 1965, when the Supreme Court decided
Carrington v. Rash, were these provisions struck down.93

90. Table 1 is based on information originally gathered in ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE
RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 346-55
tbl. A.14 (2009). Keyssar’s tables have been altered for my purposes. Table 1 provides information about the length of durational residency requirements in the states but omits
other pertinent information about these requirements, such as whether the durational
residency requirement was imposed constitutionally or by statute; whether categories of
persons temporarily in the state, such as military personnel or students, were excluded
from claiming residency; and whether voters relocating within the state who did not meet
local county, municipality, or precinct requirements were still eligible to vote in their old
counties, municipalities, or precincts.
91. Id. at 396 n.20.
92. Id. at 346-55.
93. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1965) (holding that a state could not deny
the right to vote to a bona fide resident merely because he is a member of the armed
services).
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In the 1890s, durational residency requirements were also used in
the Southern states—along with poll taxes and literacy tests—to disenfranchise African Americans, whom many southern whites unfairly considered to be “nomadic.”94 African Americans often had a harder
time proving their residency and the length of their stay in a certain
area, and durational residency requirements were used to discriminate against them.95 Wherever they existed, state durational residency qualifications penalized mobility and reinforced parochial perspectives. In the South, where states had a special affection for long residency requirements, their length served “to promote [the] acquiescence of public officeholders to the status quo interests of a slaveowning . . . society.”96 In 1875, Alabama increased the length of its
state residency requirement for voting from sixth months to one year;
in 1901, it increased it to two years. North Carolina increased its requirement to two years in 1876. Mississippi followed suit in 1890,
South Carolina in 1895, Louisiana in 1898, and Virginia in 1902.97
By the turn of the twentieth century, durational residency requirements were commonplace in most of the states. The prevalence
of these laws suggests that they played an important role in many
states. One scholar has argued that the proliferation of these requirements “reflect[ed] xenophobic tendencies” and that they were
“out of spirit with the idea of [a] national union.”98 But this view is
probably extreme. Though it is hard to doubt that, in many instances,
states increased the length of their durational residency requirements when they wanted to make it harder for outsiders to settle
within their borders, it may also be the case that mandating a durational period of residence before giving one the vote resulted from
inertia. In the meantime, county, township, district, and precinct durational residency requirements patterned themselves after the state
models. American society was not especially mobile at this time, and
those who picked up and moved to a different state comprised a small
percentage of the country’s growing population. As such, it is likely
that the lengthy durational residency requirements that existed in
the 1800s reflected the negative attitude of some communities in the
country toward newcomers, outsiders, and mobility.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 89.
Id. at 88-90.
See LeClercq, supra note 3, at 854.
See KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 346-55 tbl.A.14.
LeClercq, supra note 3, at 855.
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III. THE DEMISE OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTERS
Durational residency requirements are not a monolithic phenomenon. Both in theory and in practice, it is important to distinguish
between two different types of durational residency requirements.
The first is the one the framers wrestled with at the time of the Constitutional Convention: their debates concerned whether a residency
requirement should be imposed on political candidates and those
seeking to hold public office. The second type of durational residency
requirement concerns those seeking to cast a ballot—in other words,
voters. These two types of durational residency requirements are
conceptually distinct and deserve to be analyzed separately.99
Most states impose durational residency requirements on both
voters and political candidates, but the individuals affected, the period of duration required, and the justifications given for each of these
distinct durational residency requirements differ significantly. As the
democratic theorist Robert Dahl has explained, democracy involves
both the freedom to vote and the freedom to run for office.100 It thus
makes sense that the durational residency requirements enacted by
the states would target each activity separately. For decades, lengthy
durational residency requirements existed for both voters and candidates in the states. However, in the 1970s, the durational residency
requirements for voters began to be extensively cut back. This Part
examines what happened to the durational residency requirements
that the states imposed on voters and how they were curtailed.
A. The Federal Challenge
All states had some kind of durational residency qualifications
that they maintained by the 1930s and 1940s. These usually restricted voting for a new resident until the person lived in the state for one
year, although there were cases where the durational period was
both longer and shorter. In rural areas and in the Midwest, the residency period was often only six months. The state constitutions of
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, and Oregon all required only a six-month residency for suffrage. Indiana and South Dakota also
required six months of residency, although it had to be preceded by a

99. But see Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (explaining that “the rights of
voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that
affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters”).
100. See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 5 (1971). Dahl
plots the freedom to vote and the freedom to run for office on a two-dimensional matrix. He
calls the right to vote “the right to participate in elections and office” and right to run for
office “public contestation.” Each right can be plotted on Dahl’s two-dimensional matrix on
a scale from “none” to “full.” Id.
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year’s residency in the United States. In many southern states and in
Rhode Island, the durational requirement was two years.101
There were also important exceptions to these durational residency requirements. One important exception applied to those serving
overseas. When servicemen could not be around to satisfy a durational residency requirement, absentee voting laws had to be fashioned to account for this. Before the Civil War, absentee voting was
rare. As the United States became entangled in overseas conflicts,
however, and men who were serving their country could not return
home to vote in its elections, absentee voting became more prominent.102 During World War I, nearly three million men were sent
overseas. Their absence meant these voters could not satisfy the long
durational residency requirements that some of their states imposed.
As a result, by 1918, nearly all of the states crafted provisions to exempt servicemen from durational residency requirements during
times of war.103 The exceptions created for servicemen eventually began to be applied to other kinds of workers, including those who had
to be absent from their state on official government business.104
Until World War II, durational requirements spanning months
and even years continued to be an accepted prerequisite to voter registration. Multiple factors—including the limited textual support for
the right to vote in the Constitution, and the relatively small levels of
interstate migration—ensured that there was little opposition to
these laws. However, the sharp increase in interstate travel and migration that followed World War II, combined with the Supreme
Court’s interest in protecting the right to vote during the Warren
Court era, soon put durational residency qualifications on the national agenda, in the crosshairs of Congress, and on court dockets.
As voting rights cases made their way to the Supreme Court in
the 1960s, voting rights issues began to seep deeper into the American consciousness. The large number of citizens who were ineligible
to vote because of a state’s durational residency requirement soon
began to draw the public’s attention.105 To respond to pubic pressure,
101. See KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 183, 352.
102. Id. at 122.
103. Id.; see generally Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History
of the Right to Vote, 71 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 1345 (2003) (examining the effect of war on
the right to vote and finding that to mobilize the necessary support for a war the franchise
has often been extended to groups that were previously excluded).
104. See KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 122.
105. They also drew the attention of legal scholars. In the late 1960s and 1970s, an
increasing number of law reviews devoted space to addressing issues surrounding the imposition of durational residency requirements. See, e.g., Lawrence P. Bemis, Age and Durational Residency Requirements as Qualifications for Candidacy: A Violation of Equal Protection, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 161 (1973); David Cocanower & David Rich, Residency Requirements for Voting, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 477 (1970); James R. Fisher, Durational Residency Re-
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many state legislatures adopted “return-to-vote” legislation. These
laws were designed to make it easier for residents who relocated
within the state’s borders to vote, often by lowering precinct or county durational residency rules or else providing a way for residents
who had moved to a different county within the same state to cast a
ballot in their old precincts.106 These rules lacked uniformity from
state to state, and they also did little to solve issues facing interstate
movers. Although many people during this time felt that the status of
durational residency requirements for voting should remain a states’
rights issue, pressure also began mounting for Congress to enter the
fray and play a much larger national role in these matters.107
By the 1960s, in most states, a one-year durational residency requirement had become the norm. A survey conducted in 1962 found
that a one-year residency was required by 34 states. In another
twelve states, the in-state residency period was six months. In four
states, it was two years.108 The impact of these laws on an American
society that had become increasingly more mobile was starting to
take its toll. In every decade since 1900, geographic mobility in the
United States had steadily increased. Nonetheless, durational residency rules continued to impede voting for many of those who may
have desired to exercise this right. In the early 1960s, a study commissioned by the American Heritage Foundation examined the causes of nonvoting in presidential and congressional elections. It found
that of the country’s 104 million voting-age citizens in 1960, eight
million were adults who had recently moved and were disqualified
from voting by state, county, and precinct durational residency requirements.109 In 1964, according to another source, durational residency laws prevented fifteen million people from voting.110
Congress soon realized that it had to take action. Under the Constitution, the states set “[t]he [t]imes, [p]laces, and [m]anner” of holding elections for federal officials.111 But Congress has the power, unquirements in State Elections: Blumstein v. Ellington, 46 IND. L.J. 222 (1971); Edward
Tynes Hand, Durational Residence Requirements for Candidates, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 357
(1973); Mable A. Minor, State Durational Residence Requirements as a Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, 3 N.C. CENT. L.J. 233 (1972); Ronald L. Rowland, Voter Residency
Requirements in State and Local Elections, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 600 (1971); Comment, Residence Requirements for Voting in Presidential Elections, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 359 (1970).
106. See John R. Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of
a Mobile Society, 61 MICH. L. REV. 823, 832 (1963).
107. Id. at 833.
108. See id. at 829.
109. Id.
110. See KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 223 (citing The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 107 n.21 (1972)).
111. See U.S. CONST. art, I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
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der Article I, Section 4, to pass a federal law “at any time” that could
alter the rules set by the states.112 In 1970, Congress sought to regulate durational residency requirements when it passed its first
amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.113 Aimed at ending the
system of mass disenfranchisement that had kept many African
Americans from the polls, particularly in the southern states, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 was one of President Lyndon Johnson’s
greatest legislative achievements. The law would become so monumental that scholars would later come to view it as a “sacred symbol”
of American democracy.114 But not all sections of the original Voting
Rights Act were permanent. Given the unprecedented scope of federal power that was granted by this statute, President Johnson and
Congress decided to make some of its most far-reaching provisions
temporary.115 Section 5 of the VRA, which required all of the states in
the South to seek federal “preclearance” for any changes made in
their voting practices or procedures, came with a sunset provision.116
In 1965, Congress had designed Section 5 to ensure that voting
changes in “covered jurisdictions,” which encompassed all of the
states of the Deep South, could not be implemented until a favorable
determination has been made by the U.S. Attorney General or the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia that minority voting
rights were not being negatively affected. The provisions of Section 5
were enacted as temporary legislation and set to expire in five years.
In 1970, however, Congress recognized the need for these special
provisions to continue in force, and it moved to renew them for an
additional five years. It was while holding its hearings on reauthorizing Section 5 that Congress decided to amend the Voting Rights Act
in other ways as well, and one of these included adding an amendment that targeted durational residency requirements.117
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except
as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”).
112. Id.; see also Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter
Qualifications Clause of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159 (2015).
113. Voting Rights Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 316 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)).
114. See Richard Pildes, What Does the Court’s Decision Mean?, 12 ELECTION L.J. 317,
317 (2013) (calling the Voting Rights Act a “sacred symbol” of American democracy); see
also Eugene D. Mazo, The Voting Rights Act at 50 and the Section on Election Law at Birth:
A Perspective, 14 ELECTION L.J. 282, 283-85, 287-89 (2015) (assessing the history of the
Voting Rights Act on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary).
115. See Mazo, supra note 114, at 288; see also STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, ‘‘THE LAW IS
GOOD’’: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, REDISTRICTING, AND BLACK REGIME POLITICS, at
xii (2010).
116. Mazo, supra note 114, at 288.
117. Voting Rights Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 316 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)); see also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 19293 (1971).
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Using its constitutional power to alter the rules pertaining to federal elections, Congress added a new Section 202 to the Voting Rights
Act in 1970. It was aimed at regulating how the states conducted
their presidential elections. So that no mistake was made as to the
intent of Section 202, its very first paragraphs stated the following:
Section 202(a). The Congress hereby finds that the imposition and
application of the durational residency requirement as a precondition to voting for the offices of President and Vice President, and
the lack of sufficient opportunities for absentee registration and
absentee balloting in presidential elections—
(1) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens
to vote for their President and Vice President;
(2) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens
to enjoy their free movement across State lines;
...
(5) has the effect of denying to citizens the equality of civil rights,
and due process and equal protection of the laws that are guaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment; and
(6) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State
interest in the conduct of presidential elections.118

To guarantee and protect the right to vote, Congress found that it
was necessary to abolish the durational residency requirement as a
precondition to voting for the President and Vice President, as well
as to establish nationwide standards relative to absentee registration
and absentee balloting for future presidential elections.119
Under Section 202, Congress moved to accomplish these goals in
several ways. First, it prohibited individual states from imposing a
durational residency requirement on any U.S. citizen who was otherwise qualified to vote in a presidential election and who wanted to
register and vote for the President or Vice President of the United
States.120 Second, it prohibited the states from denying a citizen the
right to vote in a presidential election if that person was validly registered to vote but happened not to be physically present in his state
at the time of the election.121 If the citizen was absent, the state now
118. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Title II, § 202 (a)(1)-(6), 84 Stat. 314, 316.
119. Id. § 202(b).
120. Id. § 202(c) (“No citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in
any election for President and Vice President shall be denied the right to vote for electors
for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, in such election because of the failure of such citizen to comply with any durational residency requirement of
such State or political subdivision . . .”).
121. Id. (“[N]or shall any citizen of the United States be denied the right to vote for
electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, in such elections because of the failure of such citizen to be physically present in such State or political
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had to provide him with the opportunity to cast an absentee ballot to
vote for the President or Vice President.122 Third, Congress mandated
that the states had to allow a citizen to vote in a presidential election
if he was registered to vote thirty days before the election took
place.123 Finally, if the citizen moved to his new state within thirty
days of a presidential election, he had to be given the right to vote by
absentee ballot in his or her former state of residence.124
In addition to extending the coverage of Section 5 the Voting
Rights Act and changing the way that Americans vote for the President and Vice President with the addition of Section 202, the 1970
Amendments suspended the use of literary tests as a prerequisite to
voting in all states.125 The 1970 Amendments also mandated that
states lower their voting age to eighteen for all federal, state, and local elections.126 Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts pushed
for this last provision to be added to the 1970 Amendments, knowing
that his colleagues in Congress would find it impossible to deny the
right to vote to young people, many of whom were fighting and dying
for their country in Vietnam.127 Although durational residency requirements presented too minor of an issue to capture the imagination of most American citizens, they did receive some attention
among the constellation of voting rights issues that were on the
national stage. The fact that they were presented as part of a packsubdivision at the time of such election, if such citizen shall have complied with the requirements prescribed by the law of such State or political subdivision providing for the
casting of absentee ballots in such election.”).
122. Id. § 202(d) (“[E]ach State shall provide by law for the casting of absentee ballots
for the choice of electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, by all duly qualified residents of such State who may be absent from their election
district or unit in such State on the day such election is held . . . .”).
123. Id. (“[E]ach State shall provide by law for the registration of other means of qualification of all duly qualified residents of such State who apply, not later than thirty days
immediately prior to any presidential election, for registration or qualification to vote for
the choice of electors for President and Vice President . . . .”).
124. Id. § 202(e).
125. The Voting Rights Act’s new section 201 imposed a ban on literacy tests and devices as conditions for voter registration in all jurisdictions until August 6, 1975. See 42
U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1970). Section 4(a) of the Act, passed in 1965, had already suspended
literacy tests in “covered jurisdictions” until August 6, 1975. See Voting Rights Act of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 437, 438.
126. Section 302 granted the right to vote at age eighteen in every primary and general
election. See GARRINE P. LANEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965,
AS AMENDED: ITS HISTORY AND CURRENT ISSUES 16 (2008), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/109556.pdf. Although the Supreme Court invalidated this provision for state
and local elections, the 26th Amendment, ratified in 1971, later would guarantee the right
of eighteen-year-olds to vote in all elections. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
127. See GARY MAY, BENDING TOWARD JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 206-07 (2013) (noting how Kennedy campaigned to reduce the national voting age and quoting him as saying that “half of the
deaths in Vietnam are of young Americans under twenty-one”).
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age, together with the other voting rights reforms included in the
1970 Amendments, ensured they could pass through Congress.
Though voting rights occupied center stage in the American consciousness in the early 1970s, it has not always been evident to
scholars why the conservative Nixon administration offered the 1970
Amendments. Professor Keyssar suggests that the new rules constituted “safe, uncontroversial means of responding to a resurgence of
public concern about low electoral turnout,” and that they may have
“buttressed the Republican Party’s presentation of itself as an advocate of universal suffrage.”128 The new changes called for by the 1970
Amendments also could have been influenced by the shift in thinking
about the nature of American society, which had become more geographically mobile after World War II.129 In the nineteenth century,
when most of the states’ durational residency requirement were enacted, most Americans were born, raised, and spent the bulk of their
lives living in a single community.130 By contrast, the “mobile” part of
the population was comprised of unskilled workers and migrants.131
But, as Professor Keyssar points out, this pattern shifted in the
twentieth century, with the middle and upper classes becoming much
more mobile and workers becoming much less so.132
President Richard Nixon had expressed doubts about the constitutionality of some of the new voting provisions that had been passed
with the 1970 Amendments, especially the lowering of the voting age
to eighteen. Vetoing Congress’s bill, however, was not in the cards for
Nixon. Although doing so would appease the South, the prospect of
limiting the franchise after a proposal had been made to expand it
would have put him at odds with public opinion, not to mention many
members of his own Republican Party who had voted for these
changes. Thus on June 22, 1970, Nixon quietly signed the 1970
Amendments into law.133 At the same time, he instructed his Attorney General, John Mitchell, to challenge them in court.134
Nixon’s challenge resulted in Oregon v. Mitchell,135 the case in
which the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970. The Court examined whether
Congress could lower the voting age, ban literacy tests, and forbid
durational residency requirements from disqualifying voters, each as
128. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 223.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See MAY, supra note 127, at 208.
134. Statement on Signing the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 1970 PUB.
PAPERS 512 (June 22, 1970).
135. 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970).
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separate issues. The Supreme Court held it unconstitutional for Congress to lower the voting age for state elections, while it upheld its
right to do so in federal elections.136 Justice Hugo Black found that
the Elections Clause allowed Congress to regulate federal elections,137
though no such provision in the Constitution also allowed it to regulate the election of state officials.138 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment,
which lowered the voting age to eighteen years of age throughout the
country, including in the states, was ratified a year later, in reaction
to Oregon v. Mitchell.139 In addition to finding that Congress could
regulate the vote age for federal elections, the case also upheld Congress’s ban on literacy tests under the Fifteenth Amendment.140
In finding that Congress had the power to regulate federal though
not state elections, Oregon v. Mitchell was important for another reason: the case also upheld Congress’s imposition of the “30-day” registration rule on the states for presidential elections.141 Though there
were different allegiances of Justices for other parts of the opinion,
the vote finding that Congress had the power to impose a thirty-day
registration deadline for federal presidential elections was eight to
one.142 Justice Black based his reasoning on the power that Congress
had to regulate federal elections under Article I, Section 4.143 Justice
Douglas wrote separately to explain that he would uphold the requirement under Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.144 Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall found yet
other justifications for upholding this requirement, including the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the guarantee that citizens
should have the right to travel freely across state lines.145 Only Justice Harlan dissented, arguing that none of these constitutional provisions should have been availing in this case.146
After Oregon v. Mitchell upheld the 1970 Amendments and their
prohibition on durational residency requirements, the states were
136. Id. at 117-18.
137. Id. at 119-24 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4).
138. See id. at 124-29.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (“The right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of age.”).
140. Oregon, 400 U.S. at 132.
141. Id. at 134.
142. See id. at 213-16 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining that it is “inconceivable” that
the language of the Constitution can be understood to abolish state durational residency
requirements).
143. Id. at 119-24.
144. Id. at 150.
145. Id. at 237-38, 264-67 (Brennan, J., joined by White, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
146. Id. at 213-14.
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essentially forced to make a choice: they could now either shorten
their durational residency requirements for electing state officials to
approximately thirty days, or they could waste state resources to
administer two different durational residency or registration deadlines for voting. Many states that would otherwise have preferred
a period of duration longer than thirty days suddenly found it to
be more trouble than it was worth to maintain one deadline for registering their citizens to vote for the U.S. President and another deadline to register the same individuals to vote for other state offices.147
In many states, this brought a swift end to the lengthy durational
residency requirements that the states had previously imposed.
B. The Judicial Challenge
Despite the mandate that came from Congress for the states to
shorten the registration period for presidential elections to thirty
days, there were places where lengthy durational residency requirements for state electoral contests continued to persist. Not all states,
after all, were interested in applying the 30-day registration period
required for presidential elections to their state elections. Then, in
the early 1970s, several cases regarding state durational residency
requirements began to wind their way to the Supreme Court. These
cases sought to challenge the durational residency laws of the states
on constitutional grounds. Eventually, the Supreme Court’s decisions
in these cases worked in tandem with the 1970 Amendments to curtail the ability and authority of the states to impose long durational
residency requirements on their new voters.
The most important of these cases was Dunn v. Blumstein.148 Decided in 1972, this case held that Tennessee’s one-year residency requirement for voting in state elections violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.149 James Blumstein had
moved to Tennessee on June 12, 1970, to begin employment as an
assistant professor of law at Vanderbilt University.150 With a view
toward voting in the upcoming August and November elections, he
went to register to vote on July 1, 1970.151 The county registrar refused to register him, however, because Tennessee law authorized
the registration of only those people who were residents of the state
for a year and residents of their county for three months.152
147. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN & DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (2012).
148. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
149. Id. at 331-33.
150. Id. at 331.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 331.
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Blumstein did not challenge Tennessee’s power to restrict the vote
to bona fide residents of the state.153 Nor did Tennessee dispute that
Blumstein was a bona fide resident.154 Rather, Tennessee insisted
that in addition to being a resident, a would-be voter had to satisfy
its durational residency laws.155 In Dunn, the Supreme Court had to
determine, for the first time, what level of scrutiny to apply to state
durational residency requirements. Noting that these laws penalize
people who travel from one place to another, the Supreme Court explained how such laws end up dividing a state’s legitimate residents
into two classes: old residents and new residents.156 Both classes are
legitimate, from the state’s view, but the state discriminates against
the latter class of people by denying them the opportunity to vote.157
Framing the problem in this way, the Court proceeded to analyze
whether the Constitution allows this kind of discrimination.158
Never had durational residency laws been viewed through the
lens of discrimination. Now the Supreme Court scrutinized the fact
that these laws prevented some legitimate residents from voting,
thus depriving a class of citizens of “a fundamental political right,
[that is] preservative of all rights.”159 Tennessee urged the Supreme
Court to uphold its one-year durational residency requirement under
the Court’s own precedents—in 1965, the Court had summarily affirmed Drueding v. Devlin,160 upholding a durational residency law in
Maryland against a constitutional challenge. But in Dunn, the Supreme Court distinguished Drueding on the grounds that Drueding
was a summary affirmance of a district court decision that was decided without the benefit of oral argument.161 Moreover, the sufficiency of Maryland’s durational residency law had been tested in Drueding under the standard that would typically be applied to ordinary
state regulations, not under the more exacting standard that had
been developed for voting rights cases in the ensuing years.
In several important voting rights cases, the Supreme Court had
decided that strict scrutiny should be applied to laws that discrimi153. Id. at 334.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 334-35.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 335.
159. Id. at 336 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)); see also Joshua A.
Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143
(2008) (explaining that although courts have always said that the right to vote is a “fundamental right,” they have sometimes applied strict scrutiny to laws that challenge that
right and have at other times inconsistently applied a lower level of review).
160. 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff’d per curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
161. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 337.
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nated between different classes of a state’s citizens. In the most important of these cases, Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,162
decided in 1969, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to a state
law that prevented residents from voting in the local school board if
they did not own property or have children enrolled in the local
schools. Kramer held that if a state law granted the right to vote to
some citizens and denied it to others, the courts had to determine
whether such exclusions were necessary “to promote a compelling
state interest.”163 In Dunn, the Supreme Court found that Tennessee’s residency statutes impinged on a fundamental right—the right
to vote—and thus should be subject to strict scrutiny.164 In addition,
the Court found that Tennessee’s residency rules also directly impinged on a second fundamental right, “the right to travel.”165 Having
determined that strict scrutiny was mandated, the Court went on to
distinguish durational residency requirements from bona fide residency requirements that ensure that voters are actually citizens of
the state and county in which they register, and that “may be necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community.”166
Tennessee had offered two justifications for its residency qualifications. The first was to “[i]nsure [the] [p]urity of [the] [b]allot [b]ox.”167
State officials feared that non-residents would cross state lines, falsely swear allegiance to Tennessee, and vote by fraud to sway its elections.168 The Supreme Court dismissed this justification.169 Residence
in Tennessee was established by taking an oath, and there was no
evidence that the state took any actions beyond requiring an oath to
check that a person was a bona fide resident.170 It was not clear to the
Court how a longer durational residency period would prevent a corrupt non-resident from fraudulently registering and voting.171 In addition, the Court found it difficult to justify Tennessee having two
different duration periods.172 If only a three-month period was needed
to determine a person’s legitimate residency in his county, it was unclear why a one-year period was required to legitimate a voter’s resi162. 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969). For the history of this case, see Eugene D. Mazo, The
Right to Vote in Local Elections: The Story of Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,
in ELECTION LAW STORIES (Joshua A. Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016).
163. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627.
164. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336.
165. Id. at 338.
166. Id. at 344.
167. Id. at 345.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 345-46.
170. Id. at 346.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 347.

2016]

RESIDENCY AND DEMOCRACY

643

dency in the state.173 The presence of two different durational requirements was illogical. Moreover, if Congress had already set the
amount of time that a state had to register a new voter to cast a ballot in a federal presidential election at thirty days, with the 1970
Amendments, it was not entirely clear why a state needed more time
than this to register the same person to vote in its state elections.
The second justification that Tennessee provided for its durational
qualifications was to ensure a “knowledgeable voter.”174 Tennessee
wanted to have voters who had become members of the community,
were interested in matters of government, and were likely to vote intelligently.175 But the Supreme Court dismissed this justification as
well, for again it allowed the state to discriminate against different
classes of citizens based on arbitrary criteria.
In Kramer, New York had tried to prevent a childless adult from
voting in a school board election because the state argued that nonparents were “less informed” about school affairs than parents were.
New York wanted to limit the franchise only to voters who were “interested” in the outcome of its school board elections.176 The Supreme
Court applied strict scrutiny and struck down the statute in question,
finding that New York’s classification, which excluded non-parents
from voting, prevented some people from voting who were as substantially interested in what a local school board did as those allowed
to vote.177 Similarly, in Dunn, the Court struck down Tennessee’s durational residency requirement because Tennessee’s law proved to be
a crude device for achieving the state’s goal of assuring a knowledgeable electorate.178 Tennessee allowed all longtime residents to vote
regardless of their knowledge of the issues. At the same time, it excluded new residents who sought to educate themselves.179
Ultimately, Dunn held that “30 days appears to be an ample period of time for the State to complete whatever administrative tasks
are necessary to prevent fraud—and a year, or three months, too
much.”180 That finding suddenly threatened to place a significant
burden on states to prove that their lengthy durational residency requirements were necessary and served a compelling state interest.
The very next year, however, the Court decided two related cases
that seemed to extend the state durational residency period beyond
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 347-48.
Id. at 345, 354-55.
Id. at 345.
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
Id.
Dunn, 405 U.S. at 357-58.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 348.
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what was allowed in Dunn. In Marston v. Lewis,181 decided in 1973,
the Court upheld a fifty-day durational residency requirement in Arizona. This time the Court relied on the state’s legislative judgment
that this period was “necessary to achieve the State’s legitimate
goals.”182 In particular, Arizona had relied on a volunteer deputy registrar system that was massive in scope and that resulted in a certain number of mistakes per registered voter, which the state needed
more time to correct at each precinct.183 Another factor that was
unique in Arizona was the timing of the state’s primary system. Arizonans held their primaries in the fall, and because of their work in
the primary, country registrars and their staffs were often delayed in
processing incoming applications to register Arizona voters for the
general election.184 As such, the Court accepted Arizona’s judgment
that a period of fifty days was necessary to promote the state’s important interest in obtaining accurate voter lists.185 However, Justices
Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan dissented in Marston.186 They
thought that a thirty-day durational period should suffice for Arizona, especially since, under the 1970 Amendments, the state already
had to use it to register those voters who wanted to vote in federal
presidential—but not state—elections.187
On the same day in 1973 that Marston was handed down, the
Court also decided Burns v. Fortson,188 upholding a Georgia statute
that required all registrars to close their voter registration books fifty
days prior to the November general election, except regarding those
persons who sought to vote for the President of the United States only. Georgia offered extensive evidence to establish the need for a fiftyday registration cut-off, given the numerous requirements and vagaries of its election laws. A registration cut-off, technically, is not the
same thing as a durational residency requirement, and the distinction is important to explain. A durational residency requirement applies only to new residents, while a registration cut-off deadline applies to all state residents who seek to register to vote. However, in
practice, the two requirements work similarly. Still, if Dunn held
that the maximum permissible durational residency requirement was
thirty days, the decisions in Marston and Burns seemed to challenge
that. Should the limit be set at thirty days? Fifty days? Sixty days? In
Burns, the Court held that “the 50-day registration period approach181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

410 U.S. 679 (1973).
Id. at 680.
Id. at 681.
Id.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 682-85.
Id. at 683-84.
410 U.S. 686 (1973).
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es the outer constitutional limits in this area,”189 but it did not state
exactly what those limits were. Scholars have since suggested that
the maximum period is likely somewhere between the fifty days
approved in Burns and the three months struck down in Dunn.190
C. The Modern Durational Residency Requirement
Ultimately, two factors led to the demise of lengthy durational residency requirements in the states—at least for voters. The first had
to do with the intervention of the federal government in the form of
the 1970 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The second
had to do with the intervention of the Supreme Court. Both happened
in the 1970s, on the heels of the voting rights struggles of the 1960s.
Today, given that the Supreme Court has declared lengthy residency requirements for voting in state and local elections unconstitutional, most of the states have changed or eliminated their durational
residency requirements to comply with the Court’s rulings. Instead,
they have implemented registration cut-off deadlines by which voters
have to register. In Hawaii, the registration cut-off deadline is thirty
days.191 In other states, such as Florida and Arizona, the cut-off is
twenty-nine days.192 In Kentucky, it is twenty-eight days.193 Another
set of states requires approximately three weeks for new registrations. The time period is twenty-four days in Oklahoma;194 twentytwo days in Colorado;195 twenty-one days in Maryland, Maine, Oregon, Virginia, and West Virginia;196 and twenty days in Kansas, Massachusetts, and Minnesota.197 Other jurisdictions close their registration periods approximately two weeks before an election. In Alabama
and California the period is fourteen days,198 and in Iowa it is eleven
days.199 Connecticut requires a new voter to be registered only seven

189. Id. at 687.
190. See, e.g., LeClerq, supra note 3, at 862 (“The maximum constitutionally permissible durational residency requirement for voting is . . . apparently somewhere between the
3-months intrastate requirement disapproved in Dunn and the 50-day requirement approved in Marston and Burns.”).
191. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-24 (West 2015).
192. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-101(A)(2) (2015); FLA. STAT. § 97.055(1)(a) (2015).
193. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.045(2) (West 2015).
194. OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 26, § 4-103 (West 2015).
195. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-201(3)(b)(I) (2015).
196. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-302 (LexisNexis 2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
21-A, § 121-A (2015); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 247.025 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2416 (2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-2-6 (LexisNexis 2015).
197. KAN. STAT. ANN § 25-2311 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 51, § 26 (2015);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 201.054 (West 2015).
198. ALA. CODE § 17-3-50 (2015); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3400 (West 2015).
199. IOWA CODE ANN. § 48A.9 (West 2015).
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days before an election,200 and at least one state—North Dakota—
uses same-day voter registration, so that a new voter could actually
register to vote and cast his or her ballot on the same day.201 Table 2
contains a fifty-state survey of durational residency periods and
registration cut-off periods in the United States as of 2015.202
Two points deserve emphasis. First, some states have managed to
retain registration periods that are longer than thirty days, although
there are not many of them. Georgia currently requires a voter to
register by the “fifth Monday . . . prior to the . . . election,” which in
practice puts the registration deadline out five to six weeks.203 Second, it must be emphasized again that modern registration periods
are not exactly the same as the durational residency qualifications
that were challenged in Dunn. The justification for asking a citizen to
register at least thirty days before an election is administrative efficiency.204 States do not set up these registration deadlines to restrict
the franchise, to control their community of voters, or to create more
knowledgeable voters. Today, that would be unconstitutional. Rather,
they do it because that is how long it takes them to process a voter’s
paperwork, verify his address, and communicate his eligibility to the
municipality where the election will be held.205
Finally, though state durational qualifications for voting have
withered, there is another sense in which state durational residency
requirements have not disappeared. Even after it became illegal for
the states to apply durational residency requirements to the right to
exercise one’s vote, the states continued to apply them to other areas
of everyday life as a way of protecting their resources from newcomers and outsiders. Over the years, durational residency requirements
have been applied to prevent newly-resident students from seeking
in-state tuition,206 to keep new residents from using a state’s laws to
file for divorce,207 to restrict new residents from receiving a state’s
200. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-23g (West 2015).
201. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-05.1 (2015).
202. Calculations made by author based on a 50-state survey of state statutes. Complete dataset of these statutes is on file with the author and available upon request.
203. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-224 (2015).
204. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348 (1972) (noting “that 30 days appears to be an ample period of time for the State to complete whatever administrative
tasks are necessary to prevent fraud—and a year, or three months, too much”).
205. Id.
206. See Lawrence J. Conlan, Durational Residency Requirements for In-State Tuition:
Searching for Access to Affordable Higher Learning, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1389 (2002); William
S. Eubanks II, North Carolina’s Durational Residency Requirement for In-State Tuition:
Violating the Constitution’s Inherent Right to Travel, 1 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 199 (2009);
Susan L. Kanclier, Stateless Students: Oregon’s Durational Residency Requirement for
Purposes of Tuition, 74 OR. L. REV. 1319 (1995).
207. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (upholding a one-year durational residency
period in the state of Iowa for new residents to be able to file a petition for divorce); see also
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welfare benefits,208 to keep a new resident from becoming a municipal
employee, and to make it harder to gain admission to the bar.209
Where courts have determined that durational residency requirements impinge on a fundamental right, these requirements have
been invalidated. For example, this has generally been the case when
states have tried to link state benefits to a resident’s length of residency in that state.210 Some of the jurisprudence concerning these
durational residency qualifications has been controversial. Yet there
is one group of individuals to whom durational residency qualifications have been consistently applied less controversially: newlyresident political candidates seeking to get elected to a state office. At
least at the state level, politicians generally continue to be barred by
durational residency requirements, as we are about to see.
IV. THE STABILITY OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENTS FOR CANDIDATES
A different story emerges with respect to durational residency requirements for candidates. Durational residency qualifications continue to be imposed on many political office-seekers by state law and
by state constitutional provisions. These requirements have been justified by the states as ensuring more informed and knowledgeable
political candidates, guaranteeing the exposure of prospective candidates to voters, and assuring that a candidate running for office is a
member of the political community he hopes to represent.
There have been many cases in the courts challenging durational
residency requirements as they apply to candidates for office.211 But
whereas durational residency requirements for voters were struck
down under such challenges, courts have largely upheld the durational residency requirements for candidates. In so doing, they have
drawn a sharp distinction between the right to vote and the right to
Doris Jonas Freed & Henry H. Foster, Jr., Durational Residency Requirements as Prerequisites for Divorce Jurisdiction, 9 FAM. L.Q. 555 (1975); William H. Luker, Durational Residency Requirements for Divorce, 29 ARK. L. REV. 415 (1975); David E. Pierce, Durational
Residency Requirements for Divorce, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1976); Note, Durational Residency Requirements for Divorce, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 187 (1974).
208. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (invalidating a California welfare statute
that imposed a one-year waiting period on new state residents); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down a one-year residency period imposed by a state as a prerequisite to receiving welfare payments on the basis that this would allow a state to discriminate between different classes of state residents); see also David A. Donahue, Durational
Residency Requirements for Welfare Benefits, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 451 (1998).
209. Paul G. Gill, Invalidation of Residency Requirements for Admission to the Bar:
Opportunities for General Reform, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 231 (1989).
210. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (invalidating an Alaska statute that
distributed the state’s income from oil revenues among state residents based on each citizen’s length of residence within the state).
211. See Pitts, supra note 3, at 347 n.22 (listing several such cases).
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be a candidate for office. In part, the durational residency requirements for candidates have been more difficult to challenge because
they have long been enshrined in state constitutions. At the same
time, it is worth noting that the situation facing candidates for federal office differs from that facing candidates for state office. At the
federal level, there are no durational residency requirements for candidates to satisfy, apart from those for the President and Vice President. However, at the state level, these requirements abound. Thus,
durational residency requirements for candidates differ by office.
A. At the State Level
Durational residency requirements are common for state offices,
such as the office of the governor or a member of the state legislature.
Candidates for governor can expect to face some of the most stringent
durational residency requirements in the nation. As Table 3 indicates, Missouri and Oklahoma impose a ten-year durational residency requirement on gubernatorial candidates.212 A durational residency period of seven years is also not unheard of. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Tennessee all require their candidates for governor to be a state resident for seven years before they can be elected to office.213 Another
seventeen states set the durational residency period for governor at
five years.214 In only a handful of states are these durational residency requirements almost entirely absent. Even in these states, a gubernatorial candidate must usually satisfy the same durational residency period as is required of a state elector or voter. Table 3, below,
lists the length of the durational residency requirement for the office
of the governor for every state as of 2015. In most states, these requirements are constitutionally mandated. By contrast, residency
requirements for local office, such as mayor or city councilman, are
often set by statutes or municipal codes. They also tend to have much
shorter durational residency periods.

212. See MO. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (Missouri); OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (Oklahoma).
213. See ALA. CONST. art. V, § 117 (Alabama); ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 2 (Alaska);
ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (Arkansas); FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (Florida); MASS. CONST. pt. II,
ch. 2, § 1, art. II (Massachusetts); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. XLII (New Hampshire); N.J.
CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 2 (New Jersey); PA. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (Pennsylvania); TENN.
CONST. art. III, § 3 (Tennessee).
214. A five-year period seems to exist in the largest plurality of the states. See, e.g.,
CAL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (California); HAW. CONST. art. V, § 1 (Hawaii); IND. CONST. art. V, §
7 (Indiana); LA. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (Louisiana); ME. CONST. art. V, pt. I, § 4 (Maine); MISS.
CONST. art. V, § 117 (Mississippi); NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (Nebraska); N.M. CONST. art.
V, § 3 (New Mexico); N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (New York); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 4 (North
Dakota); S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (South Carolina); TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (Texas); UTAH
CONST. art. VII, § 3 (Utah); VA. CONST. art. V, § 3 (Virginia); WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (Wyoming).
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As mentioned, in some of the states—including Connecticut, Ohio,
Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin—the length of time that a
candidate for governor has to reside in the state will be equivalent to
the durational residency requirement for a voter in that state. This
period will usually be around thirty days. But these exceptions are
rare, and in most cases the durational residency requirement for a
gubernatorial candidate is many years. Often, the long durational
residency periods have been used to disqualify new challengers, especially those who have not recently lived in the state. To understand
how candidate residency qualifications work, and how they have
sometimes been used by politicians against their political opponents,
we might examine some recent durational residency battles that
have wound up in the courts. Not all state durational residency challenges concern gubernatorial candidates or candidates seeking statewide office. Many of these challenges are local in nature and arise
during races to fill mayoral offices and city council seats as well.
We can compare the legal challenges brought against the candidacies of Rahm Emanuel and Zephyr Teachout on durational residency
grounds. Both of these durational residency challenges attracted significant media attention when they occurred, even though the races
were very different: Rahm Emanuel was running in a mayoral race to
lead city hall in Chicago while Zephyr Teachout was running for the
Democratic nomination to become governor of New York. We can also
contrast the hurdles that Emanuel and Teachout faced in their races
with those faced by Hillary Clinton in her race to become the U.S.
Senator from New York in 2000. Hillary Clinton was not a New
Yorker and had never lived in that state. However, unlike the state
races, her qualifications could not be challenged on durational residency grounds because Clinton was running for a federal office.
1. Rahm Emanuel
Rahm Emanuel is a Democratic politician who was born and
raised in Chicago.215 He worked in the Clinton Administration
through much of the 1990s, including as Assistant to the President
for Political Affairs and as a Senior Advisor to the President for Policy and Strategy.216 In 1998, Emanuel resigned from the Clinton
215. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (Ill. 2011) (“The candidate [Emanuel] was born in Chicago . . . .”). See generally EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL,
BROTHERS EMANUEL: A MEMOIR OF AN AMERICAN FAMILY (2013) (chronicling Rahm Emanuel’s Chicago birth and upbringing).
216. See Clinton White House Appointments, BALTIMORE SUN (Jan. 15, 1993),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1993-01-15/news/1993015187_1_special-assistantdomestic-policy-president-and-deputy; Storer H. Rowley, Mayor Rahm Emanuel to Speak
on Campus, NW. U. (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2012/
11/mayor-rahm-emanuel-to-speak-on-campus.html.
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White House, returned to Chicago, and pursued a career in finance.
In 2002, he ran for the U.S. House of Representatives from Chicago,
after Rod Blagojevich, who represented Illinois’s 5th Congressional
District, announced that he was vacating his seat to run for governor.217 Blagojevich was elected governor, and Emanuel was elected to
Blagojevich’s old seat in the 5th Congressional District. Emanuel
went on to represent that district in Congress from 2003 to 2009.
When Barack Obama became President, Emanuel became his Chief
of Staff.218 On January 2, 2009, he resigned from Congress and returned to the White House, this time to work for President Obama.219
Emanuel went to great pains to maintain his Chicago residency
during his time in the White House. From the time his house was
first purchased in 1998 until he became White House Chief of Staff in
2009, his family continually resided in their Chicago home,220 while
Emanuel shuttled back and forth to Washington. During his first six
months of work in the Obama Administration, Emanuel’s family continued to remain in their Chicago home while Emanuel rented an “inlaw apartment” in the nation’s capital.221 On June 1, 2009, however,
Emanuel’s family relocated to Washington. They began to receive
their mail at the new house they rented in the District of Columbia.222 In the meantime, they rented out their Chicago home to another family. Emanuel’s family did leave several large household items
at their Chicago home, including televisions, a piano, and a bed, in
addition to books and various family heirlooms. Emanuel also continued to pay property taxes on his Chicago house, listed his Chicago
address on his personal checks, and continued to list the address of
his Chicago house as his official registered voting address.223 He also
always maintained a valid Illinois driver’s license.
Richard M. Daley had been elected the mayor of Chicago in 1989
and re-elected on five separate occasions since. In 2010, Daley announced his plans to retire.224 Daley had been leading America’s
third-largest city for twenty-one years.225 Upon learning this news,
217. See Jodi Wilgoren, Ethnic Comments Rattle Race for Congress, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 6, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/06/us/ethnic-comments-rattle-race-forcongress.html.
218. Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1053.
219. See id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1054.
224. See Bob Secter, Daley Won’t Run for Record Seventh Election to Be Mayor, CHI. TRIB.
(Sept. 8, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-09-08/news/ct-met-daley-legacy-090820100907_1_parking-meter-deal-richard-j-daley-seventh-term.
225. Id.
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Emanuel resigned his position at the White House and announced
that he would run to become the next mayor of Chicago.226 While
Emanuel’s family had remained in Chicago when Emanuel served in
Congress, residing in the house that Emanuel owned, Emanuel’s
spouse and children had been living in Washington, D.C. for several
months by the time he announced his mayoral bid, and their Chicago
home was being occupied by another family.227 When Emanuel decided to run for mayor, the rental of his Chicago home became a major
issue in the legal challenge that was brought to Emanuel’s mayoral
candidacy under Illinois’ durational residency qualifications.228
Illinois maintains a durational residency requirement for mayoral
elections. The Illinois Municipal Code states that a candidate for
mayor has to reside in the city for at least one year preceding a
mayoral contest.229 In addition, the candidate himself has to be a
“qualified elector” in Illinois.230 This means that a mayoral candidate
has to have been a resident of his voting district during the thirty
days prior to the election.231 After Emanuel resigned his position at
the White House, he immediately made plans to return to Illinois.
But as his Chicago home was now occupied by tenants, who were under contract there until June 30, 2011, Emanuel decided to lease an
apartment on Milwaukee Avenue, starting on October 1, 2010.232
In November 2010, lawyer Burt Odelson filed a legal challenge to
Emanuel’s mayoral candidacy on behalf of Thomas L. McMahon, a
retired Chicago police officer, and Walter P. Maksym Jr., a Chicago
lawyer.233 The challenge asserted that Emanuel did not meet the
state’s one-year municipal durational residency requirement and that
his name could not be placed on the ballot for the mayoral election to
take place on February 22, 2011. McMahon and Maksym took issue
with Emanuel renting out his Chicago property while he lived in
Washington, claiming that Illinois law required the mayoral candi-

226. See Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1053.
227. Id. at 1054; Gavin J. Dow, Note, Mr. Emanuel Returns from Washington: Durational Residence Requirements and Election Litigation, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1515, 1526
(2013).
228. Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1066.
229. The relevant provision is Illinois Municipal Code § 3.1-10-5(a), which states: “A
person is not eligible for an elective municipal office unless that person is a qualified elector of the municipality and has resided in the municipality at least one year next preceding
the election or appointment . . . .” 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3.1-10-5(a) (West 2016).
230. Id.; see also Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1056-57.
231. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3.1-10-5(a) (West 2016).
232. Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1054.
233. See Kristen Mack, Rahm Emanuel’s Residency Challenged in Race for Mayor, CHI.
TRIB. (Nov. 26, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-11-26/news/ct-met-rahmresidency-challenge-20101126_1_residency-rules-ballot-challenge-lawyer-burt-odelson.
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date to be physically present in Chicago for one year.234 Emanuel contended that he met the requirement because he owned a home in
Chicago, voted there, and always intended to return.235 He also pointed to an exception in the state’s election code that protected the residency status of persons who temporarily left “on business of the
United States.”236 Emanuel argued that his years in the White House
fell into this category. The challengers claimed that this exception
applied only to those who left the state to serve in the military.237
McMahon and Maksym’s complaint came before the Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, which, after holding an
evidentiary hearing, dismissed it and ruled that Emanuel’s name
should be included on the ballot as a mayoral candidate.238 The Board
determined that Emanuel had met the qualifications of the Illinois
Municipal Code.239 The Board noted, and both sides agreed, that “residence” in the Municipal Code referred to “permanent abode,” and
that two elements were required to prove it: physical presence and
the intent to remain permanently.240 In the Board’s view, once permanent abode was established, residence continued until it was
“abandoned.”241 Emanuel’s challengers failed to establish that he had
abandoned his permanent residency in the City of Chicago.242
Emanuel’s challengers sought judicial review of the Board’s decision in the circuit court of Cook County, which affirmed the Board of
Election Commissioners.243 The circuit court agreed with the Board
that the relevant question in the case was whether Emanuel had
abandoned his Chicago residence when he became Chief of Staff to
the President of the United States.244 Finding that he had not abandoned it, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision.245 Emanuel’s
challengers did not give up, however. They appealed the circuit

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (Ill. 2011).
239. Id. at 1054.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, No. 2010 COEL 020, 2011 WL 222521 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. Jan. 4, 2011), rev’d, 942 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 950 N.E.2d 1051
(Ill. 2011).
244. Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1055.
245. Id.
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court’s decision to the Illinois Appellate Court.246 There they received
a more favorable ruling. By a two-to-one vote, the appellate court reversed the circuit court and set aside the decision of the Board.247
The Illinois Appellate Court focused on the meaning of the words
“resided in” in the Illinois Municipal Code and specifically the requirement that a candidate must have “resided in the municipality at
least one year next preceding the election.”248 It noted that the Board
had used the definition of residence that was appropriate in voter
qualification cases, but Emanuel’s case was a candidate qualification
case. The Illinois Appellate Court was not convinced that using the
same definition of residence for voter qualification contests and candidate qualification contests was appropriate. The Illinois Supreme
Court had never ruled on the matter.249 Thus the Illinois Appellate
Court determined that the phrase “resided in” in the Municipal Code
did not refer to a permanent abode, but only to the place where the
candidate “actually live[s]” or “actually reside[s].”250
The Illinois Appellate Court’s decision of January 24, 2011 was
quickly appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, given that Chicago’s
mayoral election was less than a month away. Until the appellate ruling, Emanuel had been steamrolling his challengers in the polls. Then,
within days of ballots being printed and early voting starting in Chicago,
it seemed as if Emanuel’s name was not going to appear on the ballot.251
On January 27, 2011, however, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the
Illinois Appellate Court and held that Emanuel’s name should appear
after all.252 To reach its decision, it relied on the 140-year-old case of
Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie.253 When Smith, a longtime resident of
Illinois, was appointed a circuit judge by the Illinois governor, an action
was brought to remove him from that office on the grounds that he
had not been a resident “for at least five years next preceding . . . his

246. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 942 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
247. Id.; see 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5(a); see also Monica Davey, Court Says Rahm Emanuel Not Eligible to Run for Mayor, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2011, 1:27 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/01/24/court-says-rahm-emanuel-not-eligible-to-run-for-mayor/.
248. Maksym, 942 N.E.2d at 743.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 745.
251. See Rick Pearson & Kristen Mack, Emanuel Scrambles to Get Back on Mayoral
Ballot, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 25, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-01-25/news/
ct-met-mayor-race-0125-rahm-20110124_1_residency-requirement-rahm-emanuelmayoral-ballot.
252. Id.
253. 44 Ill. 16 (1867); see also Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 950 N.E.2d 1051,
1059 (Ill. 2011).
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appointment,” as the Illinois Constitution then required.254 His challengers asserted that Smith had moved with his family to Tennessee for
eight months during the five-year durational period.
In 1847, the Illinois Supreme Court found that Smith’s time in
Tennessee did not result in the abandonment of his Illinois residency.
Once established, it found that “residence is lost . . . by a union of
intention and acts,” which are to “be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances.”255 Smith had frequently declared that his move to
Tennessee was an experiment, expressed a desire to return home to
Illinois upon arriving in Tennessee, declined to vote in Tennessee out
of fear of losing his Illinois citizenship, refused to sell his Illinois law
books because he thought he would need them when he returned to
his Illinois practice, and rented out his Illinois residence instead of
selling it when he left.256 Since Smith was decided, the Illinois courts
had held that the question of whether a candidate abandoned his
state residency was a question of intent.257 A residency was established with physical presence and intent to remain indefinitely. Once
established, the test of whether it was kept became abandonment.258
Thus a person could be physically absent from his residence
“for months or even years” without abandoning it.259 And whether
one abandoned his residency turned on what his intent was. Since
Emanuel owned a house in Illinois while living in Washington, and
had always said he intended to return to Chicago, the Illinois
Supreme Court found he never abandoned his residency.
After the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision, Emanuel’s name was
placed on the ballot for mayor of Chicago. On February 22, 2011, he
won fifty-five percent of the vote and was elected mayor. He was
reelected in 2015. Emanuel’s durational residency battle attracted
254. Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1057.
255. Smith, 44 Ill. at 24.
256. Id. at 23-24.
257. Illinois case law bore this out. See, e.g., People ex rel. Madigan v. Baumgartner,
823 N.E.2d 1144, 1150 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“ ‘[W]here a person leaves his residence and
goes to another place, even if it be another [s]tate, with an intention to return to his former
abode, or with only a conditional intention of acquiring a new residence, he does not lose
his former residence so long as his intention remains conditional.’ ” (quoting Pope v. Bd. of
Election Comm’rs, 18 N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ill. 1938))); Walsh v. Cty. Officers Electoral Bd., 642
N.E.2d 843, 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (whether candidate abandoned old residence in favor of
new residence presents a question of intent, which is measured both by the “surrounding
circumstances” and the candidate’s declarations); Dillavou v. Cty. Officers Electoral Bd.,
632 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (whether candidate abandoned established residence is a question of intent, and “ ‘an absence for months, or even years, if all the while
intended as a mere temporary absence for some temporary purpose, to be followed by a
resumption of the former residence, will not be an abandonment’ ” (quoting Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, 195 (1888))).
258. Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1060.
259. Id.
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widespread media coverage.260 This coverage launched a debate about
the wisdom of durational residency requirements generally.261 The
case generated commentary by non-lawyers and had an effect, according to Gavin Dow, a little like that which was felt in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore.262 Dow argues that Emanuel’s legal battle
brought into sharp contrast “the inherent tension between protecting
voter choice and promoting the rule of law when interpreting and enforcing a candidate qualification rule.”263 It also showcased some of
the complexity that candidate qualification cases involve and some of
the strain that they put on courts when they are required to make
quick decisions in a complicated yet important area of the law on the
eve of an election.264 As Dow rightly explains, this can throw the impartiality of the courts into question.265
2. Zephyr Teachout
Like Emanuel’s race to become mayor of Chicago, Zephyr
Teachout’s attempt to challenge Andrew Cuomo, a sitting governor,
in New York’s Democratic primary demonstrates how durational residency requirements can be used to attack a challenger at the state
level. Teachout is a law professor and a scholar of election law. Born
and raised in Vermont, she went to law school at Duke University
and later was admitted to the North Carolina bar.266 In 2004, she
worked as Director for Internet Organizing for the presidential campaign of former Vermont governor Howard Dean.267
In 2009, Teachout moved to New York to take a position as an assistant professor of law at Fordham University.268 In 2014, when the
labor-backed Working Families Party of New York considered snubbing Andrew Cuomo and giving its ballot line to Teachout, the media
began to focus on the previously unknown candidate.269 The Working
Families Party ultimately chose to stick with Cuomo as its candidate,
260. See Dow, supra note 227, at 1533.
261. Id; see also Richard L. Hasen, Let Rahm Run! The Illinois Courts Should Let the
Voters Decide Whether He’ll Be Chicago’s Next Mayor, SLATE (Jan. 24, 2011, 6:20 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/01/let_rahm_run.html.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Weiss v. Teachout, No. 700014/14, slip op. at 4-5 (Sup. Ct. King’s Cty. N.Y. Aug.
11, 2014) (on file with the author).
267. Samantha M. Shapiro, The Dean Connection, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/07/magazine/the-dean-connection.html?pagewanted=all.
268. Weiss, slip op. at 5.
269. Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Contests New York Residency of Teachout Before Primary,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/nyregion/cuomo-tochallenge-teachout-over-alleged-new-york-residency-ineligibility-before-primary-vote.html.
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but at that point, Teachout decided that she would run for governor
of New York on her own. She managed to gather more than 45,000
signatures and filed paperwork to challenge Cuomo in the Democratic primary.270 In response, Cuomo immediately challenged her candidacy, asserting that Teachout failed to meet the durational residency
requirement of the state she wished to govern.
Like Illinois, New York maintains a durational residency requirement that candidates for the office of governor must meet. New
York’s constitution requires a candidate for the office of governor to
have resided within the state for a five-year period immediately preceding the election.271 Teachout, who moved to New York in June
2009 and announced plans to run for governor in July 2014, barely
met the requirement.272
Teachout’s situation differed from Rahm Emanuel’s in several important respects. Unlike Emanuel, Teachout did not own her own
home. Emanuel also had a career in Illinois and an established track
record there prior to serving in the Obama Administration, whereas
Teachout had never lived in New York before taking up her position
at Fordham Law School.273 To make matters more complicated,
Teachout did not consistently remain in New York during the five
qualifying years needed to satisfy her durational residency requirement.274 As an academic, she held various visiting fellowships that
took her for months at a time outside of the state.275 Nor did Teachout
always rent an apartment in New York, much less the same apartment.276 She changed homes often. She also stayed with friends in
New York for long stretches of time without paying any rent.
In most legal disputes over a person’s residence, a distinction is
made between the terms “residence” and “domicile.” Domicile refers
to the place where an individual has established a permanent home,
one that he or she intends to return to even if the person may be
temporarily located elsewhere. Residence, on the other hand, refers
to a person’s temporary, physical place of abode. However, under
New York Election Law, the two terms both refer to the candidate’s
270. Id.
271. See N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“No person shall be eligible to the office of governor or
lieutenant-governor, except a citizen of the United States, of the age of not less than thirty
years, and who shall have been five years next preceding the election a resident of this
state.”).
272. See Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Contests New York Residency of Teachout Before Primary, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/nyregion/cuomo-tochallenge-teachout-over-alleged-new-york-residency-ineligibility-before-primary-vote.html.
273. Id.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id.
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permanent home.277 New York’s election law defines the term “residence” as “that place where a person maintains a fixed, permanent
and principal home and to which he, wherever temporarily located,
always intends to return.”278
Two of Cuomo’s supporters, Harris Weiss and Andrew Sternlicht,
filed a court petition to challenge Teachout’s candidacy for governor,
arguing that Teachout did not meet the durational residency requirements set out in New York’s constitution.279 In New York, disputes over a candidate’s residency are generally handled by the
supreme court in one of New York’s counties. As Teachout resided in
Brooklyn at the time of this challenge, the supreme court—or trial
court—in Brooklyn heard her case.280 The court noted Teachout’s peripatetic background. Though she was raised in Vermont, the court
explained how Teachout had attended college in Connecticut and law
school in North Carolina.281 She clerked for a judge on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania, and then returned
to North Carolina to work as a death penalty lawyer, all while claiming Vermont as her official state of residence.282
Once Teachout moved to New York, she resided in at least six different locations within New York City. From August to September
2009, Teachout sublet an apartment at 22 Irving Place in Manhattan. From September to November 2009, she rented an apartment at
228 West 25th Street in Manhattan. From December 2009 to March
2011, she resided with a friend at 241 East 7th Street in Manhattan.
From April to October 2011, she lived in an apartment at 153
Roebling Street in Brooklyn. From November 2011 to November
2012, she resided in an apartment at 72 West 82nd Street in Manhattan.283 In November 2012, Teachout began to reside at 171 Washington Park in Brooklyn, and she was living there at the time of her
durational residency trial, which took place on August 7-8, 2014.284
Unlike Emanuel, who had always been registered to vote in Chicago, even when he lived in the District of Columbia,285 Teachout registered to vote in New York only about eleven months after she

277. Charisma L. Miller, Zephyr Teachout Case Explained by Brooklyn Court,
BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.brooklyneagle.com/articles/2014/8/12/
zephyr-teachout-case-explained-brooklyn-court.
278. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 1-104 (McKinney 2016).
279. Weiss, slip op. at 1-2.
280. Miller, supra note 277.
281. Weiss, slip op. at 4.
282. Id. at 4-5.
283. Id. at 5.
284. Id. at 5-6.
285. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (Ill. 2011).
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moved there for the first time.286 And while Teachout did file tax returns in New York for the years 2009 through 2013,287 the challengers to her gubernatorial candidacy made an issue of how often she
was absent from the state during her years as a resident. Teachout
spent several summers in Vermont, one summer at the Library of
Congress in Washington, D.C. working on a book, and time in Arizona working with community organizers.288 In 2010, she spent seven
weeks in Massachusetts while she taught at Harvard, though she did
not give up her New York apartment during this time and returned
to it on weekends. In spring 2014, right before she decided to run for
governor, Teachout spent another four months living in Washington,
D.C. as a fellow of the New America Foundation.289 During this time,
she sublet her Brooklyn apartment to someone else.290
Teachout’s challengers claimed that her many absences from the
state meant she did not manifest the necessary intent to make New
York her domicile for purposes of satisfying New York’s Election
Law,291 which required physical presence and intent to remain indefinitely. They also pointed out how, despite living in New York since
2009, Teachout continued to use her parent’s Vermont address on
her driver’s license and car registration. She also used the Vermont
address as her address on file with the North Carolina bar, and
for documents she had filed with the government, such as her W-4,
employee wage withholding forms, and for a form she filed with the
Federal Election Commission after contributing to President
Obama’s reelection campaign.292 The challengers also showed that
Teachout had registered to vote in New York only in May 2010,
almost eleven months after she arrived, though she did not vote
anywhere else since.293
At her trial on August 7–8, 2014, the supreme court of King’s
County, in Brooklyn, ultimately ruled in Teachout’s favor.294 The
court explained that the challengers had the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that Teachout had not been a resident
286. See Weiss, slip op. at 6.
287. Id. at 6-7.
288. Id. at 7.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 8.
291. Id. at 9.
292. Id. at 9-10. Teachout countered by arguing that New York is a state filled with
people who come from somewhere else and that she spent time in Vermont with family
during holidays and summer vacations. Terri Hellenbeck, Former Vermonter Stirring up
NY Politics, VT. FREE PRESS (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/
news/local/2014/08/05/former-vermont-challenges-cuomo/13589997/.
293. She also filed New York state income tax returns from 2009 to 2013. Miller, supra
note 277.
294. Weiss, slip op. at 12.

662

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:611

of New York for five years prior to the election. They failed to meet
that burden.295 The court found that Teachout’s multiple apartments
in New York City were “all places where she lived, ate her meals,
slept, kept her personal items/clothing, furnished and/or decorated,
and where she occasionally entertained.”296 Regarding the Vermont
address and not applying for a New York driver’s license until May 5,
2014, the court accepted Teachout’s explanation that she maintained
the Vermont address as a mail drop because it was more reliable
than her apartment address, and that she, like many New Yorkers,
did not drive a car while in the city.297 The court found that she continuously maintained a domicile and residence in New York. She was
physically present there, and intended to remain indefinitely.
Cuomo’s campaign continued its efforts to disqualify Teachout by
appealing the ruling. But an appellate court affirmed the decision of
the trial court, allowing Teachout’s name to remain on the gubernatorial ballot.298 As the appeals court explained: “Although Zephyr R.
Teachout has resided in several different residences within the City
of New York since 2009, while maintaining close connections to her
childhood domicile of Vermont, that is nothing more than an ambiguity in the residency calculus.”299
New York’s durational residency requirement was used by Cuomo’s campaign as a political tool to undermine his opponent, and it
allowed Cuomo to avoid debating Teachout on the issues. Teachout
told newspapers that the residency challenge was a blatant attempt
to intimidate her and sap her campaign of time and resources.300
When asked about Cuomo’s decision to appeal, Teachout pointed out
how Cuomo had refused to debate her. Teachout and Tim Wu, a professor at Columbia Law School who was running for lieutenant governor, had asked Cuomo to debate them. “It’s time to take it out of
the courtroom and into a debate,” Teachout told the media.301 But
Cuomo, less than three weeks before the election, refused. Instead,
he used the durational residency requirement to challenge Teachout’s
ability to run for governor in the first place. Though Teachout’s name
remained on the ballot in New York’s Democratic primary for governor, she ultimately lost that primary to Cuomo on September 9, 2014.
Still, Teachout received thirty-four percent of the vote. Given her lack
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 4, 12.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 11.
Weiss v. Teachout, 991 N.Y.S.2d 654 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
Id.
Kaplan, supra note 269.
Laura Figueroa, Cuomo Campaign Appeals Teachout Residency Ruling,
NEWSDAY (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/gov-andrew-m-cuomos-campaign-appeals-zephyr-teachout-residency-ruling-1.9097078.

2016]

RESIDENCY AND DEMOCRACY

663

of name recognition and lack of experience in elected politics, this
result clearly demonstrated the displeasure that many Democratic
primary voters had with New York’s sitting governor.
B. At the Federal Level
We have seen how durational residency requirements exist in almost all of the states. At the federal level, however, due to the unique
compromise that the framers reached in 1787, the situation that political candidates face is quite different. According to the Constitution, a member of the House only has to be an “inhabitant” of the
state from which he is chosen to serve “when elected.”302 There is no
durational residency qualification to meet, and the term “inhabitant,”
which is looser than “resident,” implies that the candidate only has to
reside in the state on the day of his election. Similarly, a U.S. Senate
candidate only has to be an “inhabitant” of the state from which he is
chosen “when elected.”303 Whenever states have tried to add requirements, the Supreme Court has disallowed this.304 Although we would
not normally expect a candidate to run for a federal office in one state
when the candidate happens to reside in another, this has actually
happened several times in American history. Such situations put into
stark contrast the mismatch between how the durational residency
regimes function at the state and federal levels.
Hillary Rodham Clinton’s race for the United States Senate in
New York provides an example of what candidates for federal office
can do in the absence durational residency requirements. In 1999,
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan decided not to seek re-election
from New York, announcing his decision to vacate the U.S. Senate
seat that he had held since 1977. Almost immediately, longtime veterans of New York’s politics began trying to convince Hillary Clinton,
who was then the wife of the sitting U.S. President, to run for
Moynihan’s seat.305 Representative Charles Rangel, who had long
represented Harlem in Congress, first suggested the idea at a speech
he gave in Chicago. Harold Ickes, a political advisor to the Clintons,
later tried to convince Hillary Clinton in person to run for Moyni-

302. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that states
cannot impose qualifications for prospective members of the U.S. Congress stricter than
those specified in the Constitution).
305. James Bennet, The Next Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/
1999/05/30/magazine/the-next-clinton.html.
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han’s seat.306 One problem, however, was that Hillary Clinton was
not from New York—in fact, she had never lived in the state.307
Born in 1947 in Park Ridge, Illinois, Clinton spent the first eighteen years of her life in the suburbs of Chicago, before leaving in 1965
for college in Massachusetts, in 1969 for law school in Connecticut,
and in 1974 to begin her career in Arkansas.308 For the next eighteen
years, from 1974 until 1992, the Clintons lived in Arkansas, where
they dominated the state’s political scene, as Bill Clinton first served
one term as Arkansas’s attorney general and then five terms as the
state’s governor.309 During this time, Hillary became a partner at a
prominent Little Rock law firm and a high profile lawyer in the
state.310 When Bill Clinton was elected president in 1992, the Clintons moved to Washington, D.C. They resided in the White House
from 1993 to 2000.
While Hillary Clinton could legitimately claim to be the daughter
of Illinois or Arkansas, her claim to New York was more tenuous—or
rather, it was non-existent. Yet Clinton, both as the wife of the President and in her own right, had widespread name recognition, and she
worked hard to change her image and brand herself as a New Yorker
even if she had, in fact, never been one. On November 1, 1999, she
and her husband bought a $1.7 million, five-bedroom, Dutch Colonial
house in Chappaqua, New York, a suburb located in Westchester
County. She then announced that the family would move there after
Bill Clinton’s presidency ended. Hillary Clinton did not reside in this
house immediately, as her official home remained in the White
House. But the purchase of the Chappaqua home generated a great
deal of media attention, and it allowed Hillary Clinton to begin planting New York roots, even when she was still registered to vote in Arkansas.311 This was the first time the Clintons had owned a house in
306. Id.
307. See Dan Merica, Hillary Clinton’s Favorite Home State(s), CNNPOLITICS (Nov. 14,
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/14/politics/hillary-clinton-from/.
308. Hillary Rodham Clinton, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/firstladies/hillaryclinton (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
309. See William J. Clinton, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/
presidents/williamjclinton (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
310. The literature chronicling the Clintons’ time in Arkansas is extensive. See, e.g.,
CARL BERNSTEIN, A WOMAN IN CHARGE: THE LIFE OF HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON (2008);
HILLARY CLINTON, LIVING HISTORY (2004); PATRICK S. HALLEY, ON THE ROAD WITH
HILLARY: A BEHIND-THE-SCENES LOOK AT THE JOURNEY FROM ARKANSAS TO THE U.S.
SENATE (2002). Books about Bill Clinton’s life almost always also devote substantial space
to Hillary’s career. See, e.g., CHARLES F. ALLEN & JONATHAN PORTIS, COMEBACK KID: THE
LIFE AND CAREER OF BILL CLINTON (1992); ERNEST DUMAS, THE CLINTONS OF ARKANSAS: A
INTRODUCTION BY THOSE WHO KNEW THEM BEST (1993); DAVID MARANISS, FIRST IN HIS
CLASS: A BIOGRAPHY OF BILL CLINTON (1996); JIM MOORE WITH RICK IHDE, CLINTON:
YOUNG MAN IN A HURRY (1997).
311. Phil Hirschkorn, First Lady Looking Forward to New York Residency, CNN.COM
(Nov. 3, 1999, 2:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/11/03/hrc.cnn/.
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seventeen years.312 Having a home in New York gave Hillary an aura
of legitimacy and allowed her to present the appearance that she was
campaigning from a base in New York State.
There were three reasons why Hillary’s candidacy was ultimately
successful and why she was not challenged as a carpetbagger. The
first is that New Yorkers, unlike residents of other states, are especially forgiving of outsiders. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. had already been
elected to the U.S. Senate from New York as an out-of-state candidate in 1964.313 That New Yorkers were not bothered by Clinton’s
out-of-state roots was shown in the polls.314 As First Lady, Clinton
was considered a national figure, and being from Illinois, or Arkansas, or Washington, D.C. seemed not to make much difference to the
New Yorkers who elected her to the U.S. Senate in 2000.315
A second and more important reason for Hillary’s success was that
she faced very little opposition. After not having any serious Democratic challengers in the primary, Clinton expected to face New York
City’s popular mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, in the general election. Giuliani consistently attacked Clinton as a carpetbagger in the media.316
Ultimately, however, he dropped out of the race.317 His replacement,
Rick Lazio, a Republican who represented New York’s 2nd Congressional District in the U.S. House, hardly had Hillary Clinton’s name
recognition. Lazio proved to be a lackluster candidate.
The final reason that Hillary Clinton was successful was that she
ran for a federal office. As we saw, the Constitution does not maintain a durational residency qualification for federal congressional
office-seekers. The only requirement is that a Senate candidate must
be an inhabitant of the state from which he is chosen “when elected.”318 Hence, while the residency issue in Hillary Clinton’s race for
the Senate may have been a political issue, it could not be turned into
a legal issue by her opponents. A legal challenge based on the duration of Hillary Clinton’s residency would have been frivolous. Clinton
owned a house in New York on the day of the election, and on
November 7, 2000, she beat Lazio with fifty-five percent of the vote.
312. Id.
313. See Adam Nagourney, In a Kennedy’s Legacy, Lessons and Pitfalls for Hillary
Clinton; Carpetbagger Issue Has Echoes of ‘64, but Differences Could Prove Crucial, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 10, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/10/nyregion/kennedy-s-legacylessons-pitfalls-for-hillary-clinton-carpetbagger-issue-has.html.
314. Id.
315. Hillary Clinton Elected to Senate from New York, N.Y. TIMES (NOV. 8, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/08/politics/08YORK.html?pagewanted=all.
316. Adam Nagourney, Political Memo; Giuliani Takes Aim at Hillary Clinton’s Out-ofState Address, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/25/nyregion/
political-memo-giuliani-takes-aim-at-hillary-clinton-s-out-of-state-address.html.
317. Hillary Clinton Elected to Senate from New York, supra note 315.
318. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
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C. Comparing Candidate Residencies
The above case studies show how candidate residency requirements vary by state and by office. Residency requirements for federal
legislative office do not exist. Within the states, durational residency
requirements very much do exist. They differ greatly, however, depending on whether they affect statewide or municipal candidates.
Within each state, municipalities will often have their own, unique
durational requirements. Some of these durational residency requirements for state offices can be fairly long. In New Hampshire, for
instance, a candidate has to be a resident of the state for seven years
before he is eligible to run for a seat in the state senate, though only
for two years if he wishes to serve in the state house.319 In both cases,
the candidate must also reside in the district from which he is elected.320 Table 4 lists the durational residency requirements for each
house of the state senate in all fifty states as of 2015. Table 5, which
follows it, lists the durational residency requirements for the lower
house of each state legislature in all fifty states.
New Hampshire’s seven-year durational residency requirement to
serve in that state’s senate is the longest in the country.321 However,
there are other states that also possess relatively long requirements.
In Massachusetts and New York, the durational residency requirement for the state senate is five years.322 In Mississippi, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania, it is four years.323 In many other states, a durational residency of two or three years is common.324 For the lower
house of the state legislature, the durational residency requirement
is typically much shorter, but not universally so. In New York, it remains five years,325 while in Mississippi and Pennsylvania it is four
years,326 and in a number of other states the durational requirement
319. See N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. XXIX (New Hampshire State Senate); N.H. CONST. pt.
II, art. XIV (New Hampshire State House).
320. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. XXIX; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. XIV.
321. See Table 4; see also Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287, 1292-93 (D.N.H. 1974)
(Campbell, J., concurring) (upholding New Hampshire’s seven-year durational residency
requirement for the state senate in light of a federal constitutional challenge and noting
how “[s]even years, it is true, may come close to the maximum permissible” length of a
required residency); N.H. Residency Law Is Upheld by Court, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 4, 1975),
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2209&dat=19750304&id=4bNKAAAAIBAJ&sjid=
fJQMAAAAIBAJ&pg=4488,4946393&hl=en.
322. MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. 1, § 2, art. V; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 7.
323. MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 42; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2; PENN. CONST. art. II, § 5.
324. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2.4(c) (California, three years); DEL. CONST. art.
II, § 3 (Delaware, three years); HAW. CONST. art. III, § 6 (Hawaii, three years); KY.
CONST. § 32 (Kentucky, two years); N.C. CONST. art. II, § 6 (North Carolina, two years);
TENN. CONST. art. II, § 10 (Tennessee, three years); VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 15 (Vermont, two
years).
325. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 7.
326. MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 41; PENN. CONST. art. II, § 5.
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is three years.327 (Note that Nebraska is listed in each table, even
though that state has a unicameral legislature.) Given the high rates
of relocation that exist among Americans, these requirements present significant impediments to running for office in many states.
V. THE WISDOM OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
A. Judicial Justifications
Why do states continue to have durational residency requirements? One scholar who has recently examined this issue, Professor
Michael Pitts, finds that there are three prevalent rationales that
courts have invoked for these requirements. These include (1) the
ability of candidates to understand the problem and needs of their
constituencies; (2) the need for voters to have adequate time to assess
the candidacies of the persons running for office; and (3) to prevent
political carpet-bagging.328 Professor Pitts only weighs the justifications given for residency requirements for candidates. As we saw, the
courts have considered the wisdom of residency requirements for voters, too. But let us begin our examination of the justification for durational residency requirements by briefly looking at some of the rationales that Professor Pitts has found for candidates.
The first rationale for upholding durational residency requirements has to do with ensuring that candidates understand the needs
and problems of their constituents. The assumption is that a candidate who lives in the district for a longer period of time will be more
knowledgeable about that district’s issues and its constituents’ needs.
“The purpose of residency statutes,” a court in Missouri explained, “is
to ensure that governmental officials are sufficiently connected to
their constituents to serve them with sensitivity and understanding.”329 Other courts have determined that candidates should have
the opportunity to “know the customs and mores of the people,”330 to
“understand all the local problems,”331 and to “know the people of the
community.”332 In short, durational qualifications allow a candidate
327. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 2 (Alaska); CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 2.4(c) (California); DEL. CONST. art. II, § 3 (Delaware); HAWAII CONST. art. III, § 6 (Hawaii); TENN.
CONST. art. II, § 9 (Tennessee); UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 5(1)(d) (Utah).
328. Pitts, supra note 3, at 346; see also, e.g., Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287, 1290
(D.N.H. 1974) (“The three principle state interests served by the durational residency requirement are: first, to ensure that the candidate is familiar with his constituency; second,
to ensure that the voters have been thoroughly exposed to the candidate; and third, to prevent political carpet-bagging.”).
329. Lewis v. Gibbons, 80 S.W.3d 461, 466 (Mo. 2002).
330. State ex rel. Brown v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 545 N.E.2d 1256, 1259
(Ohio 1989).
331. Bolanowski v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724, 730 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
332. Id.
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“the opportunity to become familiar with the issues and concerns that
are important to the people he or she seeks to represent.”333
Separately, another rationale often invoked is that durational residency requirements provide voters with more information about the
candidate. Such requirements give voters, as the Alaska Supreme
Court put it, “a period in which they may become familiar with the
character, habits and reputation of candidates for political office.”334
They “ensure that voters have time to develop a familiarity with the
candidate.”335 The requirements provide voters the “the opportunity
to become acquainted with the candidate’s ability, character, personality, and reputation.”336 While this justification is about educating
voters, it concerns the need for having a durational residency requirement that restricts candidates.
Finally, a third reason that is often given for residency requirements is to prevent carpet-bagging. Following the Civil War, those
from the North who moved to the South to take advantage of the
unstable financial and political climate there were called “carpetbaggers.”337 The implication was that these were transient citizens
who moved south with all of their possessions to take advantage of
Southerners. A carpetbag referred to the form of luggage that these
newcomers often carried; it was essentially a suitcase or satchel that
was made out of carpet-like materials.338 The term has since been
used pejoratively to describe political candidates who move to a new
geographic region where they have no previous ties, and quickly seek
to get elected to political office there.339 Candidate residency qualifications ostensibly protect communities from these types of people. As
a federal district court in Michigan explained, durational residency
qualifications serve citizens “in protecting [them] from ‘raiders’ who
are not seriously committed to the interests of the community.”340
In addition to these justifications given by courts, Professor Pitts
argues that there are two other justifications for candidate durational residency requirements. The first of these is that these require333. Robertson v. Bartels, 150 F. Supp. 2d 691, 696 (D. N.J. 2001); see also Pitts, supra
note 3, at 347 n.22 (citing Lewis, Summit Cty., Bolanowski, and Robertson for the proposition that residency requirements serve a government interest by guaranteeing that candidates are familiar with the issues present in their district and among constituents).
334. Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Alaska 1974).
335. In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly, 40
A.3d 684, 699 (N.J. 2012).
336. State ex rel. Brown v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 545 N.E.2d 1256, 1259
(Ohio 1989).
337. See RICHARD NELSON CURRENT, THOSE TERRIBLE CARPETBAGGERS, at xi (1988).
338. Id.
339. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 18631877, at 294-96 (1988).
340. Joseph v. City of Birmingham, 510 F. Supp. 1319, 1337 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
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ments help lower the number of candidates in any given election by
keeping “frivolous” candidates off the ballot.341 Variations on the
same theme have often appeared in other forms, including justifications that durational residency requirements also prevent “ballot
crowding” and prevent an election from becoming too “unwieldy.”342
Separately, another justification that Professor Pitts finds for durational residency requirements is that they work to ensure geographic
representation. The requirement that a person has to live in a certain
geographic region of a state for a set period of time may work to better ensure that the region’s needs and character receive adequate
representation in the state’s legislature.343
B. Scholarly Reactions
The scholarly community has long been strongly opposed to durational residency requirements. As Professor Pitts states emphatically, “Residency requirements should be eliminated.”344 He contends
that durational residency qualifications neither hold up under close
scrutiny, nor do the reasons for them seem to be empirically justified.345 Several of the reasons that courts have given for these requirements are concerned with the need to protect the interests
of voters.346 Yet Professor Pitts and others argue that voters are not
ignorant. They are perfectly capable of making good choices, and a
candidate’s lack of connection to a local community is something that
voters should quickly understand and be able to judge for themselves.347 If a candidate is new to a legislative district or a candidate’s
home is located outside the geographic region from which he is seeking election, this is a matter that voters should be able to detect and
weigh in proper perspective on their own.348
Of course, whether Professor Pitts is correct on this point
is open to debate. Much of the literature on the “political ignorance”
of voters posits that one of the problems with modern democracy
is precisely that most of the public is usually ignorant of politics and
government.349 Many people know that their votes are unlikely
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Alaska 1974).
See Pitts, supra note 3, at 359.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 356 & n.46, 378-79 & n.118.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 363-64.
Id. at 364.
See generally, e.g., ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013) (making the argument that one of the biggest
problems with modern democracy is that most of the public is usually ignorant of politics
and government); see also Dmitry Bam, Voter Ignorance and Judicial Elections, 102 KY.
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to change the outcome of an election and thus do not see a benefit
in educating themselves about political candidates, much less taking
time out of their day to vote.350 Some scholars have argued that while
this may be rational, it creates a nation of people with little political
knowledge and little ability to judge good policies for themselves.351
To be fair to Pitts, his arguments only apply to durational residency
requirements as they affect candidates. As Pitts explains, “My argument and perspective is that, at least in relation to residency, voters
will likely get sufficient information [to] be able to process that information adequately.”352 In his view, durational residency requirements limit freedom of choice, limit competition, and limit the ideas
and perspectives among which voters are able to choose.353
Gavin Dow points to other serious problems with durational residency requirements. One is that they force courts to get involved in
ordinary politics. They often place courts in situations where the
court has to make a decision quickly.354 Courts that are faced with a
durational residency challenge on the eve of an election do not have
much information or good precedent on which to base their decisions,
and they risk damaging their reputations and legitimacy when they
are forced to resolve heated election contests.355 Other scholars have
also argued that durational residency requirements should be
deemed constitutionally suspect, because they impinge on fundamental rights that deserve the judiciary’s protection, including the right
of an individual to vote, the freedom to travel, and perhaps even the
First Amendment right of freedom of political association.356

L.J. 553, 555 (2013) (arguing that “the voters [are] ignorant of judicial decisions and misled
by deceptive television advertising, [they] are unable to hold [judicial candidates or] judges
accountable for erroneous decisions, clear bias, or even unethical conduct”); Christopher S.
Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties, and
Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 365 (2012) (explaining that “[m]ost voters are
astonishingly ignorant of the basic facts about government and politics.”).
350. See SOMIN, supra note 349, at 5 (positing that “[a]n individual voter has little incentive to learn about politics because there is only an infinitesimal chance that his or her
well-informed vote will actually affect electoral outcomes”).
351. See, e.g., BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES
CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007); cf. Alan S. Gerber et al., Why People Vote: Estimating the
Social Returns to Voting, BRITISH J. POL. SCI. (2014) (finding that people vote for social
reasons and survey measures of social norms about voting are correlated with county-level
voter turnout).
352. Pitts, supra note 3, at 367 (emphasis added).
353. Id. at 370-71.
354. Dow, supra note 227, at 1535.
355. Id. at 1537.
356. See LeClercq, supra note 3, at 914.
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C. Democratic Underpinnings
Despite what other scholars have written, I believe that durational residency requirements are not uniformly irrelevant, and one could
make the case that they have legitimate democratic underpinnings.
In terms of democratic theory, durational residency requirements are
not as perplexing as some scholars make them out to be. But before
advancing this argument, we first have to return to the distinction
between the two different kinds of durational residency requirements
that this Article has highlighted. First, durational residency
requirements have been applied to voters. Second, they have been
applied to political candidates. Our framers were well aware of this
important distinction, and it surfaced during their debates. Unfortunately, scholars have often collapsed this distinction when criticizing
the justifications for these requirements.
Durational residency requirements for voters are difficult to justify in a democracy like the United States that is characterized by
a high degree of mobility. In the 1970s, both Congress and the federal
courts began to understand this and, as a result, severely curtailed
durational residency requirements for voters. But importantly, durational residency requirements were not eliminated entirely. Short
durational residency periods were still needed for administrative
purposes, for instance. A state has to know who its voters are in
order to run elections effectively, and it takes time to register new
voters. Durational residency requirements for voters ensure that
elections may be run smoothly. Such durational residency requirements are often functionally interchangeable with modern voter
registration deadlines. In both cases, the requirements are designed
to give states adequate time to sign people up to vote. Yet another
justification for having short durational residency requirements for
voters is to prevent voter fraud. Beyond these reasons, it is hard to
see why durational residency requirements for voters need to exist.
The situation for candidates, however, is different. Some scholars
believe that imposing durational residency restrictions on officeseekers is unnecessary if the purpose of an election is to permit a majority of voters to select a candidate who is the most qualified individual for the job. If voters are able judge for themselves who the best
candidate to represent them is, they will place appropriate weight on
the candidate’s attributes that are relevant for the job, including the
fact that the candidate may be from somewhere else. In this sense,
durational residency requirements should be seen as being antidemocratic, the argument goes, because they could block the election of the
candidate who would otherwise be the majority’s choice.357
357. See Dow, supra note 227, at 1534.
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However, this view of the matter does not take into account other
aspects of democratic theory, for durational residency requirements
could also themselves be viewed as a legitimate exercise of popular
will.358 When durational residency requirements are enacted by democratically-elected legislatures, their existence reflects a democratic
judgment made by the people in the first place.359 There is merit in
respecting the wishes of the people, as articulated through the legislative process. From one of democracy’s other vantage points, therefore, durational residency requirements may be legitimate. This is
especially so when these requirements are enshrined in a democratically framed constitution.
There is yet another vantage point from which durational residency requirements can be justified in democratic theory. These requirements play an important role in democracy precisely because
modern democratic practice involves electing representatives from
distinct and diverse legislative districts. Those who oppose durational
residency requirements often engage in what Professor Gardner
describes as “a kind of democratic reductionism that equates democracy with raw, nationwide majoritarianism.”360 But most democracies
do not work this way.361 Because we live in a country comprised of
different electoral districts, majoritarian sentiment cannot be translated perfectly into legislative representation.362 In some cases, our
legislative districts correspond with the boundaries of our states,
which elect our Senators. In some cases, they consist of congressional
districts within the states. Usually, these districts differ significantly
from one another, not only in terms of their distinct populations but
also in terms of other values and attributes. Reasonable durational
residency requirements for candidates help to protect the interests of
these districts and help steer both state and national legislative politics in the direction of championing local issues.
The framers understood that some qualifications had to be placed
on candidates for office, and they created qualifications that ensured
capable and loyal men would serve in Congress. No person could be a
Representative unless he had “attained to the Age of twenty five
Years,”363 had “been seven Years a Citizen of the United States,”364
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. E-mail from Professor James A. Gardner to author (Aug. 25, 2015) (on file with
author). I thank Professor Gardner for sharing this idea with me.
361. Id.
362. As Alexander Hamilton explained, “Representation is imperfect in proportion as
the current of popular favor is checked.” 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 257 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia,
J.B. Lippincott 1863).
363. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
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and “when elected, [was] an Inhabitant of that State in which he
shall be chosen.”365 Similarly, no person could be a Senator unless he
had “attained to the Age of thirty Years,” had “been nine Years a Citizen of the United States,” and “when elected, [was] an Inhabitant of
that State for which he shall be chosen.”366 And if voters found the
best political candidate for a House seat happened to be twenty-four,
or the best candidate for a Senate seat happened to be twenty-nine,
would the Constitution prevent these younger candidates from being
elected? The answer is yes, it would.
Like these requirements, durational residency requirements serve
an important purpose. Our democracy is constructed out of geographic regions. Senators represent the people of their states, and Congressmen represent the people of their districts. There is something
so basically intuitive about forcing a district’s representative to reside in the district that he or she represents that even the framers
understood it. They did not want states to be represented by wealthy
interests from neighboring states, and they were fearful of reproducing the “rotten borough” system that had developed in Britain.
Though the framers ultimately did not include a durational residency
qualification for members of the House and Senate, they did include
one for the President, who had to reside in the United States for fourteen years prior to his election. And the framers were cognizant of
the durational residency requirements that existed in the states.
These qualifications allowed the states to maintain their distinct, individual, and often unique identities.
Reasonable durational residency qualifications for both voters and
candidates are required for modern democracy. “While it’s impossible
to prove residency requirements provide absolutely zero benefit in
every situation,” Professor Pitts writes, “it seems likely that situations where residency requirements clearly benefit the electorate are
outliers.”367 Professor Pitts’s argument goes too far, and this Article
disagrees with this assessment. Where voting is concerned, reasonable durational residency requirements are necessary for administrative efficiency. Where political candidates are concerned, durational
residency requirements work to ensure that local interests are
prized. In some states today, durational residency requirements may
be too long, but it cannot be said that such requirements, to the extent they are reasonable, contravene democracy entirely.

364. Id.
365. Id.
366. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
367. Michael J. Pitts, Against Residency Requirements 15 (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The best way to understand durational residency requirements is
to view them as a part of American history. These requirements were
around at the time of the colonies and their merits were debated at
the Constitutional Convention. The framers’ debates resulted in a
mixed blessing: they voted against imposing durational residency requirements on candidates for the House and Senate, while they allowed these requirements to continue to flourish in the states. That
compromise was perhaps expected, given that the delegates could not
agree among themselves on how the Constitution should regulate the
right to vote. For a number of the delegates, voting was understood to
be a state matter and that is how they preferred to leave it.
Lengthy durational residency requirements for voters were maintained by the states for nearly two hundred years. The increasing
mobility of American society following the Second World War, together with the increasing consciousness concerning voting rights of
the 1960s, eventually put durational residency requirements on Congress’s agenda. Congress limited the amount of time that the states
had to register voters for presidential elections to thirty days, and the
states began to follow suit by limiting the registration and durational
residency periods for their state election contests. The Supreme
Court helped the states along when it held in Dunn v. Blumstein that
onerous state durational residency requirements violated the Equal
Protection Clause. Once again, the states had to conform, and one by
one, they shortened the length of these requirements for voters.
The history of candidate requirements turned out differently. The
federal government had no reason to infringe upon the election of
state officials, and no constitutional basis for doing so. When candidates have challenged durational residency requirements for infringing upon their own equal protection rights, federal courts have
turned these challenges away.368 They have likewise turned away
challenges brought under the theory that candidate durational residency requirements impinge on the rights of voters.369 Over time, two
different systems would develop regarding durational requirements
for candidates seeking public office. Federal candidates had no dura368. See, e.g., Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (1974) (concluding that “the
State has a compelling inteerst [sic] to impose durational residency requirements upon
those who seek state-elective office and that such an imposition does not constitutionally
interfere with plaintiff’s right to interstate travel”).
369. Id. (“[Plaintiffs] allege that the durational residency requirement infringes upon
three constitutional rights: first, the right to vote for the candidate of their choice; second,
the right to associate for the advancement of their political beliefs; and third, the right to
interstate travel. Their contention that the residency requirement adversely affects their
right to associate and travel interstate is without merit. . . . The compelling state interest
in prescribing eligibility requirements [for candidates] clearly outweighs the minimal interference with their right to cast an effective vote.”).
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tional residency requirement to meet. Thus Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.
and Hillary Clinton could run for Senate in New York while being
residents of another state. On the other hand, the states maintained
lengthy durational residency restrictions for their governors and legislators, not to mention their mayors and city council members.
Durational requirements are not necessarily antithetical to democracy, and they have been a part of American constitutional history for as long as that great experiment has lasted. The preferred and
most effective way of gaining access to public office in a democratic
society is the ballot box. When durational residency requirements for
public office interfere substantially with the right of the people to
vote for the candidates of their choice, they should be seen as being
incompatible with a democratic government and inconsistent with
the equal protection of its laws. But reasonable durational residency
restrictions serve many important purposes. They promote a sense of
democratic community and ensure that candidates are cognizant of
local issues. They also help preserve the distinctions and characteristics of different legislative districts. Diversity in legislative districts
is a phenomenon found in the legislature of almost every state. When
the people choose who will govern them, they choose a representative
who has demonstrated a commitment to their community and to
their legislative district. In practice, our political communities are
split into bounded geographic districts. These geographic districts
elect politicians to serve in legislatures, which ultimately govern the
greater country of which the district forms a part. Our geographically
bounded political communities should have the power to determine,
within reason, the candidates whom their people elect. Durational
residency requirements in the United States further this goal.
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